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ABSTRACT 
 
Current legislation has made it possible for real estate investment trusts (REITs) to earn income beyond 
purely passive sources such as rents from real property or interest from mortgages on real property. As 
a result, both the number and market capitalization of hotel REITs have substantially increased, and the 
difference between hotel REITs and hotel C-corporations has narrowed. However, companies such as 
Starwood Hotels have reverted back to the C-corporation structure. Given these organizational changes 
and the increasing dominance of hotel REITs, there is a need to analyze hotel REITs and hotel C-
corporations in a comparative framework. 
 
Equity REITs and C-corporations have been studied extensively. However, research on various 
organizational forms in the hospitality industry is somewhat limited. This study attempts to fill this gap 
by comparing the stock market performance of publicly traded hotel REITs with hotel C-Corporations 
from 1993 to 2011. Furthermore, the impact of significant events such as mergers and acquisitions and 
legislative  amendments  on  firms’  stock  price  are  also  observed.    Finally, detailed case studies of 
companies that underwent corporate restructuring are conducted. The research objective of this thesis 
is to examine (a) whether REITs are an efficient organizational structure for the lodging industry; and (b) 
whether the tax benefits of REITs offset the regulatory constraints they face. 
 
The study infers that REIT acquirers have an advantage in mergers and acquisitions, but in all other 
situations, the net benefits of REITs are not as clear. On market cap basis, the performance of hotel 
REITs and hotel C-Corporations was almost identical, however when equally weighted, hotel REITs 
outperformed their C-Corporation counterparts.  In addition, the results show that the REIT returns are 
highly volatile.  On a broad level the hospitality business has two distinct segments – ownership of 
hotels and management of hotels and the degree of operating flexibility offered is one of the main 
factors that differentiate REITs from the C-Corporation counterparts. Therefore, this study concludes 
that  the  choice  of  corporate  structure  depends  greatly  on  a  firm’s  business  strategy.   
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ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis progresses from an overview of corporate structures in the hospitality industry to a 
comprehensive analysis of hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporations under specific circumstances. The 
organization of each chapter includes its own introduction, literature review and conclusion. More 
broadly, this thesis has been organized into four main sections.  
 
PART I. This forms the introductory section of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis topic and explains the rationale behind research 
objectives. Next, the chapter discusses the existing research addressing the advantages 
and disadvantages of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT). The literature review section 
is then followed by an overview of the US lodging industry and characteristics of lodging 
REITs. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on structural and operational 
differences between hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporations. 
 
PART II. This is a broader industry level analysis section of the thesis consisting of a chapter on 
index construction, and two chapters focused on event studies.  
 
Chapter 2 details the history of REIT legislation that influenced corporate restructuring in some 
of the most dominant players in the hospitality industry. With an understanding of the 
regulatory changes and the intent behind them, this chapter employs the event study approach 
to examine the effects of legislative action on stocks of hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporations. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the stock market reaction to merger and acquisition announcements in the 
lodging industry using the event study approach. Specifically, this chapter compares the amount 
of abnormal returns generated by hotel REIT acquirers, hotel C-Corporation acquirers and their 
respective targets.   
 
Chapter 4 compares the financial performance of publicly traded hotel REITs and hotel C-
Corporations. The introduction and the literature review summarize prior research and form the 
basis for the hypothesis and research methodology. Finally, based on the stock market 
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performance over the last 20 years, the empirical results indicate whether one form of 
corporate structure fared better than the other.  
 
PART III. This is two part case study section that examines specific hospitality firms that have undergone 
substantial changes in their corporate structure. Specifically,  
 
Chapter 5 includes the following case studies: 
A. Starwood Hotels and Resorts, Inc.  
B. MeriStar Hospitality Trust 
 
PART IV. This last section combines findings from all three sections of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 6 starts with a summary of research findings and then proceeds to conclusion section. 
In addition, this chapter identifies research limitations and makes recommendation for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduces the thesis topic and explains the rationale behind research 
objectives. Next, the chapter discusses the existing research addressing the advantages 
and disadvantages of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT). The literature review section 
is then followed by an overview of the US lodging industry and characteristics of lodging 
REITs. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on structural and operational 
differences between hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporations. 
 
 
 
 
1.1: Introduction and Overview 
 
The Real Estate Investment Trust Act of 1960 led to the formation of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs). REITs were created as a passive investment vehicle with a goal to enable small investors to make 
investments in large-scale, significant income-producing real estate. The primary benefit of a REIT status 
is the exemption of shareholder dividends from the double taxation that applies to dividends of 
traditional corporations (Graff 2001). In addition, REITs generate further savings from not having to 
engage in costly tax-minimizing strategies that are often employed by taxable firms (Gyourko and Sinai, 
1999). REITs are particularly attractive as a way to invest in real estate because REIT shares are traded 
and thus offer liquidity (Beals and Singh, 2002).  
 
However, these benefits are not without restrictions. To maintain tax exempt status, REITs are required 
to distribute 90% of their taxable income to their shareholder. In addition, REITs have to satisfy other 
regulatory requirements related to asset composition, income source and ownership diversification. 
These characteristics of REITs have given rise to a distinct organizational structure that is different from 
the traditional corporations (Tang and Jang, 2008).  
 
Through the legislative actions and clever strategies used by some firms, the REIT has evolved to 
become more than just a passive investment vehicle. Companies have been finding ways to use REIT 
status as a strategic option to improve profitability. The hospitality industry is the most noticeable 
example of this practice. The value creation in the hotel real estate sector depends on the successful 
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management of a complex operating business with leasing, operating, franchising of assets.  Therefore, 
a corporate structure that distances the owners of lodging assets from the day-to-day operation of their 
holdings is detrimental to shareholders (Beals and Singh, 2002).  Consequently, lodging companies have 
devised ways to work around the regulatory constraints of REIT and use it as more than a passive 
investment vehicle.  As a result, the gap between a hotel REIT and a hotel C-Corporation has narrowed.  
One of the goals of this thesis is to observe whether the stock market perceives hotel REITs differently 
than their C-Corporation counterparts, and whether it favors one organizational structure over another.  
 
REITs typically seek growth through acquisitions and it is argued that their tax exempt status allows 
REITs to pay higher acquisition premiums over their C-Corporation counterparts.  In the lodging industry, 
mergers and acquisitions have long been dominated by hotel REITs. For instance, in 2011 public lodging 
REITS were the most active buyers of hotel real estate, with $7.2 billion of acquisitions representing 37 
percent of commercial real estate transaction activity by dollar value1. However, it is not all rosy for 
REITs. REITs have to distribute 90% of their income and therefore, to sustain growth REITs rely heavily 
on debt and equity offerings. On the other hand, C-Corporations have higher free cash flow at their 
disposal, which allows them to take quick investment decisions. Given the importance of acquisitions to 
REITs, this thesis conducts a comparative analysis of hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporation to understand 
whether a REIT status really has advantages in mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Another interesting aspect of the lodging industry is that some firms have changed their corporate 
structure from REIT to a C-Corporation or vice-a-versa.  For example, Starwood gave up its REIT status 
and became a C-Corporation while Host Marriott made an exactly opposite move. Since the research 
objective of this thesis is to see if one form of organizational structure (i.e. REIT) is more efficient than 
the other (C-Corporation) for ownership of hotels, these cases provide an excellent resource to 
understand whether such moves were (a) motivated by the prospects of improved profitability; (b) 
forced due to legislative changes; or (c) made  necessary  by  the  change  in  a  firm’s  business  strategy.   
 
Based on the above discussion, this study intends to address the following research questions:  
1. In the lodging industry, do the tax benefits of a REIT status offset the regulatory constraints it 
imposes? Is one corporate structure more competent than the other? 
                                                             
1 Real Capital Analytics (RCA), (April 2012) Hotels Trends and Trades report. Retrieved from 
www.rcanalytics.com/trendsandtrades.aspx 
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2. Does the stock market perceive hotel REITs differently than hotel C-Corporations and if so, 
which organizational structure does it favor?  
 
 
 
1.2: REIT Regulatory Requirements 
 
In order for a company to qualify as a REIT, it must comply with certain provisions required by the Tax 
Code2: 
• Be an entity that is taxable as a corporation and managed by a board of directors or trustees 
• Have shares that are fully transferable 
• Ownership Requirement 
- Have a minimum of 100 shareholders 
- Have no more than 50 percent of its shares held by five or fewer individuals during the 
last half of the taxable year 
• Distribution Requirement 
- Pay annually at least 90 percent of its taxable income in the form of shareholder 
dividends 
• Asset Test 
- Invest at least 75 percent of its total assets in real estate assets 
- Have no more than 25 percent of its assets consist of stock in taxable REIT subsidiaries 
• Income Test 
- Derive at least 75 percent of its gross income from rents from real property or interest 
on mortgages financing real property 
• Limitations on Activities3 
- A REIT cannot ordinarily provide services to its tenants or manage its properties except 
through an independent contractor from whom the REIT does not derive any income. 
REITs  can  directly  provide  “customary  services”  to  their  tenants. 
                                                             
2 National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT), Basics of REIT, Retrieved from 
http://www.reit.com/REIT101/REITFAQs/BasicsOfREITs.aspx 
3 Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated, Real Estate Investment Trusts: The Big Three Lodging REITs, dated January 
23, 2002. Retrieved from http://libproxy.mit.edu/login/thomsonone 
 
13 
- A REIT cannot hold property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of 
business. There is an exception to this rule if the  
o REIT has held the property for rental purposes for at least four years  
o total expenditures for the property did not exceed 20% of its purchase price 
during the previous four years 
o REIT sells no more than five properties during a given taxable year 
 
 
 
1.3: Literature Review 
 
This section discusses the prior research related to the tax benefits and the corresponding regulatory 
constraint related to REITs and sets a framework for research hypotheses in the later chapters.  
 
 
1.3.1 Tax Benefits   
In their discussion on the cost-benefit tradeoff of electing REIT status as compared with a C-
Corporation, Gyourko and Sinai (1999) estimated that the net benefits of tax exempt status 
contribute 2%-5% to REITs equity market capitalizations after considering shareholder dividend 
taxes, external financing costs, and the savings from forgone tax-minimizing strategies. The 
authors also argued that the net benefits are higher for the firms with lower pay-out ratios. 
Graff (2001) observed that in addition to the corporate tax exemption, when hotel REITs sell 
their  properties,  they  don’t  have  to  pay  capital  gain  taxes  and  that  this  tax-free capital gain from 
sale of properties gives REITs economic advantages when competing with C-Corporations.  
However, Graff also noted that the tax exempt status sometimes lead to higher debt costs due 
to the loss of interest tax-shelter benefits.   
 
 
1.3.2 Regulatory Constraints  
The asset composition constraint requires a REIT to invest at least 75% of its total assets in real 
estate assets. Graff (2001) contended that this requirement closely ties REIT’s  value  to  real  
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estate market than to the broader capital market. However, Tang and Jang (2008) argue that the 
requirement preventing REITs from owning more than 10% of other companies or investing 
more than 5% of its assets in other companies helps to a certain extent by forcing REITs to 
diversify in various assets and companies.  
 
The income source constraint requires REITs to derive at least 75 percent of its gross income 
from real property. Tang and Jang (2008) argue that one of the main drawbacks of the income 
source requirement on hotel REITs is the increase in agency costs because hotel REITs need to 
lease hotels to third party companies that actually manage hotels. This process induces extra 
costs related to structuring, monitoring and enforcing contracts with third party companies.  
Per the income distribution requirement, REITs have to distribute 90% of taxable income. Kim 
and Jang (2012) observed that hotel REITs experience investment constraints due to this 
mandatory dividend payout requirement.  Along the same lines, Mooradian and Yang (2001) 
maintain that the high level of income distribution results in lower retained earnings and can 
lead to higher financing costs as firms have to depend on more costly external financing options.  
In addition, the capital intensive nature of real estate and low levels of retained earnings can 
limit the ability of REITs to grow Gyourko and Sinai (1999).  
 
Graff  (2001)  argues  that  the  ownership  test  that  requires  no  more  than  50  percent  of  REIT’s  
shares  held  by  five  or  fewer  individuals;  creates  “a  safe  harbor  for  underperforming  REIT  
managers”.   Ghosh and Sirmans  (2003)  concede  with  Graff’s  observation and add that increased 
managers’  bargaining  power  due  to  the  dispersed  shareholder  base  can  result  in  fewer  outsiders  
on Board and weak corporate governance.  
 
 
 
1.4: Hospitality Industry Operating Structure 
 
One of the unique features of the hospitality industry is its unique operating structure.  Operating 
structure describes which basic functions a hotel company performs for itself or others, and which 
functions it pays others to perform (Rietbrock and Sherman, 1997). Most people do not differentiate the 
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groups and often believe they are all in the same business with the same goals. However, that is indeed 
not the case. In fact understanding different functions is essential to understand what functions the 
lodging REIT can perform.  
 
Hospitality industry has four distinct business segments: (a) ownership of hotels; (b) leasing of hotels; (c) 
management of hotels; and (d) brand ownership/franchisor.  The degree of flexibility to conduct 
business in either one or all four segments is the chief differentiating factor that separates hotel REITs 
from hotel C-Corporations.  Below is a brief overview of each of the business segments.  
 
(a) Hotel ownership4 
Hotel owners derive their income mainly in the form of rental payments received from leasing of 
hotels they own. Typically, the hotel owner is passive with respect to all operating decisions and 
is not responsible for working capital or operating expenses. Thus, hotel owners have less 
financial risk because of guaranteed income source but the upside is limited.   
 
(b) Leasing of hotels3   
A hotel leasing company is a tenant that assumes all operating responsibilities, as well as the 
financial obligations of funding, working capital, operating expenses, and rent. Its profits are the 
funds left over after all property-related expenses have been paid. The primary revenue sources 
include room revenue, food and beverage sales, etc. Typically, hotel leasing companies assume 
the financial risk in case of a downturn but they also have more control of hotel operations and 
any resulting upside.  
 
(c)  Hotel Management5 
A management company provides management services to hotel owners for a fee. Management 
services include hotel staff members, operating systems and procedures, etc. The management 
fee has two components: base and incentive. Base management fees are calculated as a 
percentage of gross hotel revenues and generally average about 2-3%. These base management 
                                                             
3 ibid 
4 Rushmore, Stephen (2002).Hotel Investments Handbook. Retrieved from 
http://www.hvs.com/Jump/?aid=3237andrt=2 
5 Global Market Research-Hyatt Hotels, December 15, 2009. Deutsche Bank 
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fees grow with the hotel revenues for a particular hotel, and increase with unit growth (more 
rooms under management) at the corporate level.  
 
Incentive fees allow the management company to participate in the profitability of the hotels it 
manages. A typical incentive structure specifies a certain threshold above which the property 
level profits are split at a specified percentage between the manager and the owner/lessee. 
However, incentive fees are a less stable income source because in a downturn hotel profits are 
likely to fall below threshold levels.  
 
(d) Franchisors4 
Franchisors sell hotel owners the right to affiliate with their brand, which allows hotel owners to 
use the brand name, logos, and provides access to brand distribution channels.  In return for 
brand affiliation, the hotel owners pay a franchise fee or royalty, based on a percentage of the 
hotel’s  revenue. Though franchisors do not directly participate in managing the hotel, they 
approve the hotel plans, location and review the operations of the hotels to ensure standards 
are kept. 
 
 
 
1.5: Hotel REITs 
 
1.5.1 Overview 
REITs were intended as passive investment vehicle and therefore, any income generated by operating 
hotels is not considered as qualified income. As discussed in the preceding section, only hotel ownership 
is a passive endeavor. Thus, in the traditional structure, the REIT owns the hotel properties, and leases 
them to a lessee, which in turn enters into management contracts and franchise agreements with third 
parties. In this structure the REIT earns its income through the lease payments that are based on gross 
revenues, rather than net cash flow (Figure 1.1). 
 
4 ibid 
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However, current legislation allows REITs to earn income beyond passive rent income through various 
ways such as formation of wholly owned taxable REIT subsidiary lessee. In addition, companies such as 
MeriStar  Hospitality  have  devised  unique  “paper-clip”  structure6 that aligns interest of owners with 
those of lessees and/or management companies. As a result of these developments, the gap between 
hotel C-Corporation and hotel REITs has narrowed significantly.   
 
 
Figure 1.1: Traditional Lodging REIT Structure 
 
 
1.5.2 A Comparison with Hotel C-Corporations 
Operating Flexibility 
The passive income source requirement faced by REITs was relaxed with the enactment of the REIT 
Modernization Act of 1999. This legislation enabled REITs to lease the hotels they own by creating 
wholly owned taxable REIT subsidiaries (TRS).  However, the Act prohibits these TRS from operating the 
assets owned by REITs and requires them to contract with third-party management companies.  Thus, 
hotel REITs still lack operating flexibility.  
                                                             
6 Please refer to Chapter 5 Part B of this thesis for  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  “Paper-Clip” REIT 
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On the other hand, hotel C-Corporations are free to operate their own assets as well as manage assets 
of other companies. Hotel C-Corporations can also own brands.  In addition, they can reduce their 
operating costs by consolidating their support operations and managing their properties effectively.  
Thus, hotel C-Corporations have more sources of income at their disposal and enjoy a greater degree of 
operating flexibility over their hotel REIT counterparts.  
 
 
Tax Benefits 
REITs do not pay corporate taxes because they distribute 90% of their taxable earnings; whereas C-
Corporations are subject to double taxation.  Shareholders of REITs do pay taxes on dividends they earn 
but holding REIT shares can significantly reduce the combined corporate and personal taxes of tax-
deferred owners who invest via tax-exempt vehicles such as 401K plans (Beals and Arabia, 1998).  
 
As discussed in the literature review, the net benefits of tax exempt status contribute 2%-5% to REITs 
equity market capitalization after considering shareholder dividend taxes, external financing costs, and 
the savings from forgone tax-minimizing strategies Gyourko and Sinai (1999). 
 
 
Leakage and conflicts of interest 
For the lodging industry, one of the main constraining aspects of regulation is the passive income 
requirement that prevents the REITs from operating their properties. Thus, REITs are required to 
contract with third party lessees in return for lease payments. Since the lease payments are based on 
the gross revenue rather than the net income, REITs end up losing the upside potential of their 
properties to the third-party lessees. This  loss  of  profit  to  the  lessee  is  termed  as  “leakage” (Table 1.1).  
Though stepped-up leases have been used to enable REITs to participate in the potential upside, many 
REITs have failed to do so. Beals and Arabia (1998) note that during the period from 1996 to 1998, the 
leakage for RFS Hotel Investors Trust increased from 2-4% to 8-9%.  
 
With the enactment of the REIT Modernization Act of 1999, this problem of leakage was somewhat 
resolved because the REITs are allowed to lease their assets to their own taxable subsidiaries. However 
these subsidiaries depend on independent operating companies to manage the hotels they lease from 
REITs. As a result, the problem of leakage still persists. Rushmore (2002) observed that in the late 1980s 
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the hotel management companies were motivated to increase gross revenues without regard to 
bottom-line performance because they receive a fee as a percentage of gross revenues rather than of 
net cash flow. Consequently, their fees increased while the hotel owners' return declined.   
 
Hotel C-Corporations do not face the leakage issue because of the operational flexibility they enjoy. 
However, dividing management fees as base and incentive, with incentive portion tied to property level 
profits than gross revenue has reduced the leakage experienced by REITs. 
 
Table 2.1: A  Third  Party  Lessee’s  Cash  Flow  (Leakage  Experienced  by  Traditional Lodging REITs) 
Assumptions  
Number of Rooms 300 
Average Daily Rate  $80.00 
Occupancy Rate  70% 
Food & Beverage Revenue  $2,000,000 
Miscellaneous Revenue  $400,000 
Operating Expenses  $5,000,000 
Management Fee (% of revenue) 3% 
Franchise Fee (% of revenue) 2% 
Lease payments     
Percentage of room revenue 40% 
Percentage of Food & Beverage Revenue  1% 
Percentage of pther revenue  10% 
    
Cash Flow  
Revenue    
Room Revenue $6,132,000 
Food & Beverage Revenue  $2,000,000 
Miscellaneous Revenue  $400,000 
Total Revenue  $8,532,000 
Operating Expenses  ($5,000,000) 
Earnings before Lease Payments and Mgmt. fee $3,532,000 
Minimum lease payment to REIT (REIT Revenue) ($2,512,800) 
Management Fee  ($255,960) 
Franchise Fee  ($170,640) 
Lessee's EBITDA (or "Leakage") $592,600 
Lease Payment to REIT ( % of total revenue) 29.45% 
Leakage (% of total revenue) 6.95% 
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Need for Capital and Dividend Policy  
REITs are capital intensive entities that derive their income primarily from renting the assets they own. 
Therefore in order to grow, REITs need to acquire more assets, which in turn requires more capital. 
Furthermore, REITs are required to distribute 90% of their taxable income, making them more 
dependent on external sources of capital.   
 
On the other hand, hotel C-Corporations can grow through less capital intensive avenues such as 
increasing their management and/or franchise business. In addition, hotel C-Corporations do not face 
income distribution constraints.  
 
 
 
1.6: Conclusion 
 
Prior research on comparative analysis of hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporations is not only scant but also 
contradictory.  On one hand, Beals and Singh (2002) argue that the value creation in the hotel real 
estate is closely tied to the assets are operated and therefore, a corporate structure that distances the 
owners of lodging assets from the day-to-day operation of their holdings is detrimental to shareholders. 
From this perspective, REITs are ill suited for hotel as an asset class.  
 
On the other hand, Mueller and Anikeeff (2001) conclude that hotel REITs that combine real estate 
ownership with operating business perform poorly- high return volatility with low returns. While 
another study found that despite the differences in tax status, operating expense and distribution 
policies, the profitability of hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporations is not significantly different (Tang and 
Jang, 2008).  
 
Kim et al. (2002) found that hotel REITs carry highest market risk underperformed office, industrial, 
residential and diversified REITs.  Whereas, Jackson (2008) reported that on average hotel REITs 
outperform equity REIT portfolio. Thus armed with conflicting accounts, this research reexamines the 
pros and cons of hotel REITs under various scenarios by utilizing index construction, event study, and 
case study methodologies.  
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CHAPTER 2: REIT LEGISLATION AND THE LODGING INDUSTRY 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter details the history of REIT legislation that influenced corporate restructuring 
in some of the most dominant players in the hospitality industry. With an understanding 
of the REIT regulations and the intent behind it, this chapter uses the event study 
approach to examine the effects of regulatory amendments on stocks of hotel REITs and 
hotel C-Corporations. 
 
 
 
 
2.1: Introduction 
 
The primary research objective of this thesis is to understand whether the REIT structure is an efficient 
organizational form for ownership of hotels and whether the tax benefits of REIT offset the regulatory 
constraints it faces. Therefore, it is imperative to study the legislations that have changed the way REITs, 
specifically hotel REITs, operate.   
 
The REIT was intended as passive investment vehicle.  However over the years many variations of REIT, 
such as paired-share, were able to find loopholes in the legislation and exploit this unique tax conduit 
structure. This chapter starts with a brief summary of the major legislative actions and prior research, 
which forms the basis for research hypothesis described in the later sections.  
 
 
 
2.2: Legislative Evolution 
 
2.2.1. The Real Estate Investment Trust Act of 1960 
REITs were the result of the Real Estate Investment Trust Act that was passed in 1960 as a part of the 
Cigar Excise Tax Extension. REITs were created to enable small investors to make investments in large-
scale, significant income-producing real estate. However, REITs did not really grow till more than a 
decade later. One of the primary reasons for the slow growth was the income-source test. The 
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regulation  defined  the  “qualified  income” as rents received for  the  “bare  right  to  occupy  rental  realty”.  
Other income sources such as the fees generated by managing real estate funds, property management 
were not qualified. The failure to abide by these requirements meant a total loss of REIT tax status. In 
addition, the law also required REITs to organize as an unincorporated trust or association. 
 
 
2.2.2. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, President Ford signed into law the first set of REIT simplification 
amendments that eliminated the provision related to a total loss of REIT status for failure to satisfy 
income,  asset  and  distribution  requirements.  Under  this  new  act,  only  the  portion  of  income  that  didn’t  
satisfy the requirement was subject to taxation.  This act also broadened the definition of qualified 
income to include amounts received for services provided to tenants that are considered normal and 
customary with the renting of space for occupancy. In addition, REITs were allowed to be established as 
corporations in addition to business trusts; and carry forward net operating losses to the following year 
so as to reduce taxable income. However, the income distribution requirement was increased from 90 
percent to 95 percent.  
 
 
2.2.3. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984  
A  provision  in  the  Deficit  Reduction  Act  of  1984,  redefined  the  “qualified  income”  to  include  all  income  
of a paired-share  REIT,  including  its  operating  subsidiary’s  income.  Consequently,  a  paired-share REIT 
could no longer qualify as a REIT under the Code after 1984.  However, the four already existing paired-
share REITs were grandfathered and allowed unwind their operations without time limit. 
 
 
2.2.4. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 fundamentally changed the real estate investments in two important ways. 
First, the Act drastically reduced the potential for the private real estate investment market by 
eliminating many of the tax shelter provisions associated with investment in income producing 
properties. Second, this act simplified several provision related to REITs. For instance, the Act amended 
the independent contractor rule, which required REITs to contract out property management and 
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customary tenant services to a third party; by allowing REITs to manage and operate many types of 
income producing properties.  
 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also included a new provision enabling REITs to operate through Qualified 
REIT Subsidiaries (QRS). This provision allowed a REIT to manage its properties through a QRS. However, 
for the hotel industry, REITs were still restricted from earning active business income even if the 
business had a strong connection to real estate. Thus, hotel REITs were still required to contract with 
third party operating companies (Walpole, 1998). 
 
 
2.2.5. The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993  
This act amended the "Five or Fewer" rule and made it easier for pension plans to invest in REITs. The "5 
or fewer rule" was an organizational requirement that prevented five or fewer individual from owing 
more than 50 percent of a REIT's stocks. The Act amended a provision that deemed the beneficiaries of 
the pension fund as individual investors rather than considering the pension fund as a sole investor.   
 
 
2.2.5. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 
This act removed the grandfather protection for paired-share entities and essentially made it difficult for 
the sister operating company to operate any new property acquired by the REIT.  In  early  1980’s,  some  
REITs formed sister companies to operate the properties they owned. This structure, commonly known 
as  ‘paired-share’,  paired  every  owner  of  a  share  of  REIT  with  a  share  of  the sister operating company. 
This arrangement allowed REITs to derive profits from operations of its properties and allowed the 
operating companies to profit from REITs tax benefits.  
 
To prevent these practices, the IRS and Congress revised the law in 1984, by adopting Section 269B of 
the Internal Revenue Code and required a paired-share structure to meet the criteria for REITs as joint-
operations of REIT and its sister operating company.  However, Congress did not apply these provisions 
to four stapled REITs that were operating as of June 30, 1983. These "grandfathered" stapled REITs 
could continue to operate as separate entities, e.g., the REIT could own hotels and lease them to its 
affiliated non-REIT C-Corporation.  These four companies were: Hotel Investors Trust (HOT), Patriot 
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American Hospitality (PAH), Santa Anita Realty Enterprises (SAR) and First Union Real Estate Equity and 
Mortgage Investments (FUR).  
 
 
2.2.6. The REIT Modernization Act (RMA) of 1999 
One of the most important provisions of the RMA was that it allowed a REIT to form one or more 
taxable REIT subsidiaries (TRS) that can perform services to REIT tenants and others. These new 
subsidiaries could lease lodging facilities from REITs, thereby eliminating the requirement for REITs to 
lease their hotels to third-party lessee.  According to Beals and Singh (2002), hotel REITs primarily earn 
their income from percentage leases, where improved cash flow is dependent upon revenue (not profit) 
growth. The TRS provision enabled REITs to benefit from improved hotel operations by giving them 
more control of the day-to-day managerial and asset management decisions. In addition, this structure 
was more transparent compared to earlier structure where sometimes REITs contracted with private 
third party lessees which were own in part personally by some of the REIT executives7. The RMA also 
changed back the REIT distribution requirement from 95% to the 90% level. The other provisions 
included in this act were also aimed to relax regulatory constraints.   
 
 
 
2.3: Literature Review 
 
Ott and Van Ness's (2002) event study of the Taxpayer Relief Act (TRA) of 1997 on the equity valuations 
of 125 publicly traded REITs found no significant price effects on the day the legislation was signed into 
law. This result, the authors argued, was probably due to the lower reduction in capital gains tax, and 
the improved management flexibility provided to REITs in the TRA, which relatively lowered future REIT 
returns because of the increase in costs for uninformed investors.   
 
Howe and Jain (2004) examined the impact of the REIT Modernization Act (RMA) of 1999 on REIT 
shareholder wealth and found a modest positive wealth gain on the day the bill was introduced into the 
House and the day the bill was signed into law. The authors indicated that their results probably 
                                                             
7 Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. Real Estate Investment Trusts: Coverage Initiation, dated October 25, 2006. Retrieved 
from http://libproxy.mit.edu/login/thomsonone 
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underestimated the true wealth gains because of the partially anticipated nature of the legislative 
process. This study also documented a significant reduction in the systematic of REITs subsequent to the 
passage of the RMA. Howe and Jain also observed the market reaction for five broad categories of 
equity REITs: retail, residential, industrial and office, healthcare and lodging and others. The authors 
found retail REITs to be the substantial beneficiaries of the RMA.   
 
Impson and Conover (2011) extended  Howe  and  Jain’s  study  and  conducted  a  “dribs  and  drabs”  
hypothesis  in  addition  to  the  “new  information”  hypothesis  to  observe  the  price  reactions  to  both,  
formal announcements and information leakages into the stock market during the series of legislative 
actions that eventually led to the passage of the RMA.  
 
In line with the findings of the Howe and Jain study, Impson and Conover found a significant positive 
reaction on the two day event window (-1,0) when the RMA was signed into law. Despite the low 
statistical  significance  for  the  “dribs  and  drabs”  hypothesis,  this  event  study  observed  significant  price 
changes both, positive and negative, during the one year period of the legislative process.  
 
In summary, prior research on regulatory events in the REIT industry is somewhat scant. These previous 
event studies have found some changes in the stock prices of REITs around single landmark legislative 
events. Though Howe and Jain studied the impact in lodging REITs, they combined them with healthcare 
REITs and therefore, using this study to observe the effect on lodging REITs is not fruitful. In addition, as 
mentioned above, the intent of this thesis is to compare hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporations. 
Therefore, this chapter proposes an event study around legislative changes in REITs, which affected the 
lodging industry.   
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2.4: Hypotheses 
 
Among various amendments to REIT regulations discussed above, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the REIT 
Reform Act of 1998, and the REIT Modernization Act (RMA) of 1999 had the greatest impact on the 
lodging industry. This research does not examine the impact of Tax Reform Act of 1986 because the first 
hotel REIT went public in only in 1993. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the stock market reaction to the 
enactment of the REIT Reform Act of 1998, and the REIT Modernization Act (RMA) of 1999.  
 
2.4.1. Hypothesis 1 
By abolishing the grandfathered paired-share status, the 1998 act took away the economic advantages 
of the few but largest lodging REITs and leveled the playing field not only for the C-Corporations that 
lobbied for the enactment of this legislation, but also for the traditional REITs. However, given the size 
of paired-share REITs, this research proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  The enactment of the REIT Reform Act of 1998 had a negative impact on the stock price 
of hotel REITs and positive impact on that of the hotel C-Corporations 
 
 
2.4.2. Hypothesis 2 
The value creation in the hotel real estate sector depends on the successful management of a complex 
operating business with leasing, operating, franchising of assets.  Therefore, a corporate structure that 
distances the owners of lodging assets from the day-to-day operation of their holdings is detrimental to 
shareholders. From this perspective, REITs are ill suited for hotel as an asset class. However, the REIT 
Modernization Act (RMA) of 1999 narrowed this gap by increasing the benefits of owning hotel assets by 
reducing leakage to, and potential conflicts with, third parties (Beals and Singh, 2002). Based on this 
discussion, this research proposes the following hypothesis:  
 
H2:  The passage of the REIT Modernization Act (RMA) of 1999 had a positive impact on the 
stock price of hotel REITs and negative impact on that of the hotel C-Corporations 
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2.4: Data Collection 
 
Public hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporations traded around the event dates (July 22, 1998  for H1 and 
December 17, 1999 for H2) were identified using the Securities Database Corporation (SDC) Platinum 
Database using the primary Standard Industry Codes (SIC) – 7011 (hotels and motels) and 6798 (REITs).  
The hotel REITs were drawn by checking the sample against the REIT industry sector lists published by 
the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT).  
 
For the hotel C-Corporations, companies that derived most of their income from allied lodging activities 
such as casinos, gaming, food and beverages were excluded. The resulting sample of 30 companies was 
then checked to if there were other significant events that could have affected the return volatility 
during the 250 day estimation window.  Finally, the remaining 24 companies were required to have 
stock price data in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  The 
filtering process led to a final sample of 13 hotel C-Corporations and 11 hotel REITs for Hypothesis 1; and 
10 hotel C-Corporations and 14 hotel REITs for Hypothesis 2 (Table 2.1).  
 
 
 
2.5: Research Methodology 
 
2.5.1. Overview 
The event study or residual analysis is the most common analytical tools used in financial research. 
According to (Kwansa, 1994) the event study measures the impact of a given occurrence on the stock 
price of the firm by isolating it from all other occurrences. It involves predicting what would have 
happened to the stock price if the event had not occurred and this predication represents the stock 
return under the normal conditions. The predicted return is then compared to the Actual return gained 
when the event occurred. The difference between the predicted return and the Actual return is the 
‘abnormal  return’  or  the  additional  shareholder  wealth  created as a result of the event.  
 
The normal or predicted returns are calculated over an estimation window, which is usually a period far 
removed from the Actual event to eliminate impacts of information leakages on the stock price.  The 
event window is a period around the Actual  event,  when  each  stock’s  abnormal  returns  are  calculated. 
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The event day is day 0, day -1 is one day prior to the event day while day +1 is the day after the event 
date and so forth.   
 
This study used Eventus Software (Cowan, 2010) to analyze data, in which normal returns were 
estimated using a per-event period sample with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The CRSP Value 
Weighted Index was used as the market benchmark. The estimation window comprised of 200 days, 
starting -250 days and ending -51 days prior to the date of signing of the bill.  The event window was 
defined as 30 days prior to and 30 days after each Act was passed. 
 
 
2.5.2. The Market Model  
In the market model the predicted or normal return is measured in the context of the market return or 
the benchmark using the equation:  
𝑅௜௧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௜𝑅௠௧ + 𝜀௜௧  Rit = return on stock i on day t 
βi = sensitivity of stock i  to the market volatility 
αi = coefficient of stock i Rmt = return on a market portfolio m on day t 
εit = the residual or the error for stock i 
 
 
Abnormal return (or prediction error) for stock i on day t  is calculated as the difference between the 
Actual return on day t during the event period and the predicted return from the market model:  
𝜀௜௧ = 𝑅௜௧ − ൫𝛼ො௜ + 𝛽መ௜𝑅௠௧൯ 
Where the coefficients 𝛼ො௜  and 𝛽መ௜  are ordinary least squares estimates (OLS) of αi and βi 
 
 
For each event day the average abnormal return (or average prediction error) AARt is the sample mean: 
𝐴𝐴𝑅௧ =
∑ 𝜀௜௧ே௜ୀଵ
𝑁  
Where t is defined in trading days relative to the event date (e.g. t = −30 means 30 
trading days before the event) and N is the number of stocks/companies  
 
 
The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is calculated by simply adding the daily average returns 
over the event widow. If there are no unusual movements in stock price around the announcement 
date, the daily average abnormal and the daily cumulative average abnormal return should oscillate 
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randomly  around  0.  A  significant  deviation  from  0  signifies  the  market’s  response  to  the  event  
announcement (Kwansa, 1994).  
 
Table 2.1: Event Study Sample 
REIT Reform Act of 1998  (Hypothesis 1) 
    
Hotel C-Corporations Hotel REITs 
AmeriHost Properties Inc. Equity Inns Inc. 
Cavanaughs Hospitality Corp Hospitality Properties Trust 
Extended Stay America Inc. Humphrey Hospitality Trust Inc. 
Hammons John Q Hotels Inc. Innkeepers USA Trust 
Hilton Hotels Corp InnSuites Hospitality Trust 
Host Marriott Corp Jameson Inns Inc. 
Prime Hospitality Corp Meditrust Corp 
Promus Hotel Corp RFS Hotel Investors Inc. 
Signature Inns Inc. Starwood Hotels and Resorts Trust 
Servico Inc. Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc. 
ShoLodge Inc. Winston Hotels Inc. 
Suburban Lodges of America, Inc.   
Red Roof Inns Inc.   
 
  
REIT Modernization Act (RMA) of 1999  (Hypothesis 2) 
    
Hotel C-Corporations Hotel REITs 
AmeriHost Properties Inc. Equity Inns Inc. 
Bristol Hotels and Resorts Inc. FelCor Lodging Trust 
Cavanaughs Hospitality Corp Hersha Hospitality Trust 
Extended Stay America Inc. Host Marriott Corporation 
Hammons John Q Hotels Inc. Hospitality Properties Trust 
MeriStar Hotels and Resorts Inc. Humphrey Hospitality Trust Inc. 
Prime Hospitality Corp Innkeepers USA Trust 
Servico Inc. InnSuites Hospitality Trust 
ShoLodge Inc. Jameson Inns Inc. 
Suburban Lodges of America, Inc. LaSalle Hotel Properties 
  Meditrust Corp 
  MeriStar Hospitality Corporation 
  RFS Hotel Investors Inc. 
  
Winston Hotels Inc. 
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2.5.3. The Market Adjusted Return Model  
This model assumes that the market wide factors affect all the securities traded in the market and thus, 
their excess returns should equal the market return, making α  (the coefficient of stock) equal to zero 
and β (the sensitivity of the stock to the market volatility) equal to one. Thus, no information other than 
that available in the event period is required to calculate abnormal returns and past trends are ignored 
(Peterson, 1989). In this model the abnormal returns are calculated as:  
 
𝜀௜௧ = 𝑅௜௧ − 𝑅௠௧   
 
 
2.5.4. Statistical Tests 
The abnormal returns generated from the above models, need to be standardized in order to check their 
statistical significance. The standardization of abnormal returns reflects statistical errors in the 
determination of expected/predicted returns. Though a detailed discussion on various statistical 
methods and their limitations is beyond the scope of this study, below is a brief description of the tests 
conducted.  
 Parametric tests 
Patell test 
Patell test (or Patell Z Score) sums individual T-statistics and divides this sum by the 
square root of the sample size. This test assumes that the excess returns are normally 
distributed and thus assigns equal weights to each stock-event date combinations.  It 
also assumes that the returns are cross-sectionally independent (Patell, 1976). 
 
Standardized cross-sectional test (StdCsect) 
Introduced by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991), the Standardized cross-
sectional test is the extension of the Patell test. This test compensates for a possible 
variance increases in excess returns on the event date by incorporating a cross-sectional 
variance adjustment.  
 
Time-series standard deviation test (CDA) 
Time-series standard deviation test (CDA) was chiefly designed to address the problem 
of cross-sectional dependence between stocks. In this test the standard error is 
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calculated from the time series of portfolio average abnormal returns during the 
estimation period.  
 
 Nonparametric tests 
Corrado (1989) Rank test  
In  this  test  first  each  firm’s  abnormal  returns  are  ranked  over  the  combined  period  that  
includes the estimation and the event window. The test then compares the ranks in the 
event period for each firm, with the expected average rank under the null hypothesis of 
no abnormal returns (Serra, 2002). 
 
Generalized sign test  
Generalized sign test examines if the number of stocks with positive cumulative 
abnormal returns exceeds the number expected in the absence of abnormal 
performance in the event window (Cowan, 1992). 
 
 
 
2.6: Empirical Results 
 
2.6.1. Hypothesis 1: The REIT Reform Act of 1998 
The test results clearly rejected the hypothesis that the enactment of the REIT Reform Act of 1998 had a 
negative impact on the stock price of hotel REITs and positive impact on that of the hotel C-Corps.  
Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 show the summary of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for C-
Corporations and REITs respectively. Detailed results are included in Appendix 1.   
 
The result show that for the (+2, +30) period that followed the passage of the Act, hotel C-Corporations 
actually lost about 18% of their value and the results were statistically significant at the 0.001 level for 
the Patell, standardized cross sectional and CDA tests. Over the event window of (-30, +30), the C-
Corporations lost 22.87% as compared with a loss of 5.41% for the REITs over the same period (Figure 
2.1). However, the results for the REITs were statistically insignificant.  
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One possible reason for the better performance of hotel REITs as compared with hotel C-Corporations, 
could be that though the REIT Reform Act of 1998, took away the grandfathered status of the paired-
share REITs, it negatively impacted only few REITs. Thus contrary to the initial hypothesis, this act was 
probably better for the lodging REIT industry as a whole.  
 
In addition, during this period both hotel REITs and C-Corporations underperformed the broader market 
indexes such as S&P 500 and Dow Jones. Bjorn Hanson (1998) of PricewaterhouseCoopers attributed the 
decline in lodging-equity prices primarily to the increased concern over potential overbuilding and its 
impact on occupancies and room rates; IRS Restructuring Bill that included REIT Reform section, 
speculations about an impending slowdown in the U.S. economy.  Hanson also commented that the 
lodging REIT stocks did better than their C-Corporation counterparts because of the optimism about 
stronger second-half returns. 
 
Table 2.2: C-Corporations, 1998 Reform Act (N = 13) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
(-30,-2) -5.17% -6.86% 3:10< -1.691* -2.586** -0.99 -0.064 
(-1,-1) 0.37% 0.57% 8:05 0.755 0.744 0.379 1.092 
(0,+1) -0.26% -0.43% 7:06 -0.405 -0.382 -0.188 0.704 
(+2,+30) -17.79% -19.15% 0:13<<< -4.718*** -4.220*** -3.409*** -1.855* 
 
 
Table 2.3: REITs, 1998 Reform Act (N = 11) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z 
StdCsect 
Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank 
Test Z 
(-30,-2) -4.22% -4.31% 1:10<< -1.494$ -2.260* -0.821 -0.821 
(-1,-1) 1.15% 1.20% 9:2> 2.240* 1.581$ 1.203 1.165 
(0,+1) -0.06% -0.08% 5:06 -0.105 -0.116 -0.045 0.022 
(+2,+30) -2.27% -3.16% 3:8( -1.097 -0.849 -0.441 0.323 
 
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, 
using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, 
<, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less 
than in the parameter estimation period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation 
period. 
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, Hypothesis 1 
 
 
 
2.6.2. Hypothesis 2: REIT Modernization Act (RMA) of 1999 
The hypothesis that the passage of the REIT Modernization Act (RMA) of 1999 had a positive impact on 
the stock price of hotel REITs and negative impact on that of the hotel C-Corporations was confirmed 
only partially.  The period after the passage of the bill, did indicate a positive effect on both the REITs, 
however over the total cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the event window was 
negative.  Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 show the summary of CAARs for C-Corporations and REITs 
respectively. Detailed results are included in Appendix 2.   
 
The stock market did have a positive reaction on hotel REITs around the passage of the RMA on day (-3, 
+3). The CAAR for this period for REITs was 2.38% as compared with -1.95% for hotel C-Corporations. 
However, as mentioned above the total cumulative average abnormal return for the entire period shows 
REITs losing to C-Corporations. Over the event window of (-30, +30), the C-Corporations lost 9.92% as 
compared with a loss of 14.65% for the REITs over the same period (Figure 2.2). The negative CAAR 
accumulated by REITs over the days prior to the passage of the bill, skewed the total event period 
outcome.  
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Table 2.4: C-Corporations, RMA 1999 (N = 10) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z 
StdCsect 
Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank 
Test Z 
(-30,-2) -6.08% -5.68% 3:07 -0.834 -1.442$ -0.748 -0.389 
(-1,-1) -1.04% -0.54% 3:07 -0.43 -0.325 -0.69 -0.38 
(0,+1) 2.49% 2.57% 7:3) 1.436$ 0.95 1.166 0.964 
(+2,+30) -5.26% -6.73% 3:07 -0.989 -1.566$ -0.646 -0.517 
 
 
Table 2.5: REITs RMA 1999 (N = 14) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank 
Test Z 
(-30,-2) -17.22% -17.44% 0:14<<< -5.057*** -7.417*** -2.690** -1.837* 
(-1,-1) 0.00% -0.12% 7:07 -0.186 -0.218 -0.002 0.002 
(0,+1) 1.63% 1.85% 9:5) 2.042* 2.807** 0.969 1.384$ 
(+2,+30) 0.95% 1.36% 12:2>> 0.393 0.371 0.148 0.868 
 
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, 
using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, 
<, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less 
than in the parameter estimation period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation 
period. 
 
 
 
The reason for the poor performance of hotel REITs in the days leading to the enactment of the RMA 
was also observed by Impson and Conovar (2011). The authors argued that this negative return was 
likely to be caused by rumors about the legislative process. Beals and Singh (2002) observed that, in 
spite of the strong lodging fundamentals, capital markets and investors paid attention to the dot-com 
frenzy, thereby causing a reduction in lines of credit available to REITs. Since REITs are required to 
distribute 90 percent of their taxable income, they are dependent upon external financing for continued 
growth. With the falling stock prices and lack of external financing, put REITs at disadvantage. In 
addition, Starwood and Patriot American, the two largest REITs had converted to C-Corps, causing 
further decline in the value of hotel REITs as a whole.  
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, Hypothesis 2 
 
 
 
 
2.7: Conclusion 
  
The corporate restructuring in the hospitality industry has occurred mostly around the legislative 
changes.  Two of the REIT legislative amendments that greatly affected the hospitality industry and 
spurred organizational changes, were the REIT Reform Act of 1998, and the REIT Modernization Act 
(RMA) of 1999. The Reform Act of 1998 took away the economic benefits of a paired-share structure. In 
addition, C-Corporations such as Hilton and Marriott, and not the traditional REITs lobbied for the 
passage of this bill. Thus, this act was considered unfavorable for the hotel REITs. 
 
 However, this event study indicated that the stock market viewed the enactment of this act as a 
positive sign for hotel REITs as a whole. One possible reason could be that by taking away privileges of a 
selected few, this act made hospitality industry less monopolistic and more competitive.  One surprising 
finding was the negative market reaction to C-Corporations. Overbuilding has been cited as the primary 
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cause of this negative outlook. However, any over-supply should have affected hotel REITs in the same 
way as their C-Corporation counterparts.  
 
The REIT Modernization Act allowed greater flexibilities to REITs by allowing them to own 100% of 
taxable REIT subsidiaries (TRS). This essentially eliminated the need for a 3rd party lessee. In addition, the 
income distribution requirement was reduced from 95% to 90%. Thus, the RMA was hypothesized to be 
beneficial to hotel REITs. However, the event study results indicated higher negative CAAR for the (-30, 
+30) days event window for hotel REITs when compared with hotel C-Corporations. The cause of the 
negative CAAR was observed in the period prior to the enactment of the Act. REITs did accrue positive 
returns for a period around and after the passage of the bill.   
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CHAPTER 3: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE LODGING INDUSTRY: ANALYSIS OF STOCK 
RETURNS 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter is to observe the stock market reaction to merger and 
acquisition announcements in the lodging industry using the event study approach. 
Specifically, this chapter compares the amount of abnormal returns generated by hotel 
REIT acquirers, hotel C-Corporation acquirers and their respective targets.   
 
 
 
 
3.1: Introduction 
 
The primary research objective of this thesis is to understand whether the REIT structure is an efficient 
organizational form for the lodging industry and whether the tax benefits of REITs offset the regulatory 
constraints it faces. REITs have to distribute 90% of their income and therefore, their reliance on debt 
and equity offerings is heavy to sustain growth. REITs typically fuel their growth through acquisitions, 
and therefore a study of the REIT structure in M&A settings is important. To this extent, this research 
conducts an event study to examine the stock market reaction to merger and acquisition 
announcements on hotel REIT acquirers, hotel C-Corporation acquirers and their targets. 
 
 
 
3.2: Literature Review 
 
3.2.1. Do REITs Pay Higher Acquisition Premiums?  
Ling and Petrova (2010) showed that REITs pay price premiums between 14 - 16% for office and 
industrial and retail properties, while Harding and Wolverton (1999), and Lambson, McQueen and Slade 
(2004) found that REITs paid higher prices for apartment properties.  
 
Graff (2001) observed that legal constraints require REITs to invest proceeds from equity and debt 
offerings within one year, which is difficult given real estate illiquidity and the time required to perform 
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due diligence.  In addition, REIT managers are never required to liquidate real estate or return investor 
capital once the equity has been raised. That is, in contrast with the private real estate fund managers, 
REIT managers can earn fees as long as they continue to manage the REIT. Therefore, legal constraint 
that requires a quick investment of capital and the higher present value of future management fees, 
provide incentives to REIT manager to investment in real estate with less concern for acquisition costs. 
Atkin et al. (2011) confirmed Graff’s  findings  and  stated  that  the  REITS  pay  a  higher  acquisition  premium  
because REITs have a tax advantage relative to C-Corporations, and cost-of-capital advantage relative to 
individuals and partnerships, and that REITs also face regulatory time constraints to deploy capital.  
 
 
3.2.2. Mergers and Acquisitions in the Lodging Industry 
The first published event study of mergers and acquisitions in the hospitality industry looked at excess 
returns achieved by the shareholders of 18 hotel companies that were targets of acquisitions between 
1980 and 1990 (Kwansa, 1994). This study assumed that the distribution of stock returns follow a normal 
distribution and used a market model to determine abnormal returns. Kwansa found that shareholders 
of target hotel companies accrued 31.5% of total cumulative average returns 30 days before and after 
the announcement of an acquisition and majority of these abnormal gains were accumulated two days 
before and after the announcement date.   
 
Sheel and Nagpal (2000) evaluated the post-merger equity value performance of acquiring hospitality 
firm in the long run using the Jensen Measure Model and the Market Model. Their analysis of the Jensen 
Measure showed that for the 1980-2000 period, the equity value of acquiring hospitality firms dropped 
in the long run. They suggested that the positive abnormal returns in the first month after the 
announcement, was due to market speculation biases and the acquiring firms neither gained nor lost in 
the short run. However, with the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of -176.37 for a period 6 months 
prior and 36 months after the announcement, the study concluded that the post-merger equity returns 
for acquiring firms in the long run were significantly negative.  
 
Though the results of this study were consistent with the findings in other industries, a small sample size 
(21 companies) with a wide range of activities such as REITs, casinos, hotel operators, fast food with no 
discussion of the benchmark portfolio used makes the results less concrete. In addition, given the large 
event window, it is possible that other significant events such as dividend increases, management 
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reorganization etc., could have moved the stock price and elaborating on how the sample was selected 
would have been useful.  
 
Canina (2001) analyzed whether mergers and acquisitions in the lodging industry are viewed as value 
enhancing by the capital markets. Canina expanded the Kwansa study by extending the sample period 
through 1999, adding acquiring firms along with the target firms, and analyzing tenders offer separately 
from  the  typical  acquisitions.    Canina’s  results  that  the  shareholders  of  the  target  firms  benefited  from  
acquisitions  were  in  conformance  with  that  of  Kwansa’s.   
 
However, the most surprising finding was that the shareholders of the acquiring firms also benefited, 
though not as much as the shareholders of the target firms; and that the mergers and acquisitions were 
positive net present value investments for bidders. Canina also concluded that the excess gains were 
significantly greater for both acquirers and targets in acquisitions via tender offers. One of the 
drawbacks of this study is that, it used a simple mean return model as opposed to a more sophisticated 
market model and that the event window was very short, from -2 to +1 days.  As suggested by Sheel and 
Nagpal (2000), the introduction of possible biases due to market capitalization, could have been the 
reason  for  Canina’s  study  finding  the  excess  positive  returns for the acquiring firms immediately after 
the merger announcement.  
 
Using the Jensen Measure Model and the Market Model, Hsu and Jang (2007) examined long-term and 
short-term performance of acquiring firms in the lodging industry between 1985 and 2000. In addition, 
they analyzed the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) to access the accounting measures 
for financial performance of acquiring firms. The study used S&P 500 Index as a benchmark portfolio to 
calculate abnormal returns using Jensen Measure and showed that the shareholders of the acquiring 
firms did not benefit from mergers in terms of the long term equity performance. In addition, the 
analysis of both, their market model with its -5 to +5 days event window and that of the ROA and ROE 
measures, showed that acquiring firms do not profit from mergers. This study observed that the long 
term equity value of acquiring firms as well as their long term profitability declined following the 
merger.  
 
This study furthered the M&A research in the hospitality industry by utilizing  both, accounting data and 
market data to examine the short term and long term performance of acquiring firms. However, there 
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are a few limitations: the relative size of target and acquiring firms, the type of payment (stock, cash, 
both), and the type of merger (vertical, horizontal, etc.) were not controlled for.   
 
A study conducted by Yang et al., (2010) employed a similar approach as Hsu and Yang (2007), and Sheel 
and Nagpal (2000), to study post-merger stock performance of acquiring hospitality firms by using the 
Jensen Measure Model.  In addition to the S&P 500 Index (Jensen Measure), the authors also used 
sector indexes (Modified Jensen Measure) as benchmarks to study mergers completed from 2000-2006, 
for a sample of 15 US hospitality acquirers.  
 
Yang  et  al.,  (2010)’s  was the first study to separate the sample of eight hotel REITs from the seven other 
casino/hotel companies. The authors observed that the hospitality acquirers accumulated positive 
returns when compared with the S&P 500 Index. However, compared with the Bloomberg Lodging REITs 
index, the hotel REITs acquirers did not increase equity value for their shareholders; while compared 
with the Bloomberg Hotel/Casino Index, the casino/hotel companies included in the study received only 
normal gains.   
 
In his Ph.D. dissertation, Barry Bloom  conducted an event study for 19 hotel companies that were 
merged between 2004 and 2007 (Bloom, 2011). In addition to the abnormal stock returns, Bloom also 
studied volume trading for these companies around the merger announcement date. This study 
indicated that there was little prior knowledge of M&A deals because the author found statistically 
significant abnormal returns only on the merger announcement date and statistically significant volume 
activity only on and after the announcement date.  
 
In summary, though the lodging industry is a fruitful area for research on mergers and acquisitions, the 
number of existing studies is surprisingly thin (Canina et al., 2010). These prior studies around have 
concluded that targets generally benefit from these transactions, while the benefits for the acquirers 
were indecisive. Apart from the research by Yang et al., (2010), none of the earlier research separates 
the performance of REITs with that of the C-Corporations.  This paper seeks to confirm the findings of 
Yang et al., (2010) that the hotel REIT acquirers do not increase shareholder wealth. In addition, this 
paper  studies  the  effect  of  a  REIT  acquirer  on  a  target’s  returns  compared  with  that  of  a  C-Corporation 
acquirer.  
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3.3: Hypotheses 
 
Based on the existing research summarized above that REITs pay a premium for commercial real estate 
relative to their non-REIT counterparts, examining if this holds true when applied to (i) the hospitality 
industry, and (ii) the acquisitions of entire companies as opposed to single assets, and determining if the 
hotel REIT acquirers do not increase shareholder wealth; the following hypotheses were proposed: 
 
H1:  M&A transaction announcements have a greater negative impact on hotel REIT 
acquirers than that of the hotel C –Corporation acquirers; because hotel REITs pay 
higher acquisition premiums (i.e. C-Corporation acquirers would perform better). 
 
H2:  The targets of hotel REIT acquirers gain significant positive returns from M&A 
transactions when compared with that of the targets of acquirers that are C-
Corporations; because hotel REITs pay higher acquisition premium (i.e. targets of REIT 
acquirers would perform better). 
 
H3:  A market capitalization weighted target-acquirer portfolio consisting of hotel REIT 
acquirers would gain higher returns when compared with a similar portfolio with hotel 
C-Corporations as acquirers (i.e. the excess positive returns accrued to the targets of 
REIT acquirers would more than compensate for the negative returns (in hypothesis 1) 
accrued to their acquirers). 
 
 
 
3.4: Data Collection 
 
This study examines the excess returns accumulated by both acquirers and targets from acquisitions 
that were completed between August 1993 and May 2012 in the lodging industry. Since the goal of this 
study is to analyze advantages and disadvantages of a REIT structure, the sample period starts in 1993 
when the first lodging REIT went public.  
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After deciding on the sample period, the data collection process involved the following steps. First, all 
the publicly traded hotel C-Corporation and hotel REITs related M&As were drawn from Securities 
Database Corporation (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions Database using the primary Standard 
Industry Codes (SIC) – 7011 (hotels and motels) and 6798 (REITs) for both, acquirer and target. Second, 
only 264 completed deals were selected. Third, acquisition of partial or certain interests, buybacks, 
recapitalization or exchange offers were excluded. Thus, only 135 deals were selected based on SDC 
Platinum definition of mergers and acquisitions:   
“M  (MERGER):  A  combination of business takes place or 100% of the stock of a public or 
private company is acquired. 
 
A (ACQUISITION): deal in which 100% of a company is spun off or split off is classified as 
an  acquisition  by  shareholders.” 
 
Fourth, REITs that were not specialized in hotels such as Avalon Properties (apartments), ProLogis 
(industrial) and so forth were eliminated. Fifth, firms that derived most of their income from allied 
lodging activities such as casinos, gaming, food and beverages were excluded. Finally, the remaining 
companies were required to have stock price data in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at 
the University of Chicago.  The filtering process led to a final sample of 16 hospitality M&A deals with 9 
hotel C-Corporations and 7 hotel REITs as acquirers (Table 3.1).  
 Table 3.1: Deals Selected for the Event Study  
 
Year
of
Announcement
Target Type Acquirer Type
1993 La Quinta Motor Inns LP C Corp La Quinta Inns Inc. C Corp
1996 Red Lions Hotels(Red Lion Inn) C Corp Doubletree Corp C Corp
1997 Studio Plus Hotels Inc. C Corp Extended Stay America Inc. C Corp
1997 HFS Inc. C Corp CUC International Inc. C Corp
1997 Homegate Hospitality Inc. C Corp Prime Hospitality Corp C Corp
1997 Doubletree Corp C Corp Promus Hotel Corp C Corp
1997 ITT Corp C Corp Starwood Hotels & Resorts Tr REIT
1997 Interstate Hotels Co C Corp Patriot Amer Hosp/Wyndham Intl REIT
1997 Red Lion Inns LP C Corp Boykin Lodging Co REIT
1997 Santa Anita Realty Enterprises REIT Meditrust Corp* REIT
1998 Bristol Hotel Co C Corp FelCor Lodging Trust Inc. REIT
1998 American General Hospitality REIT CapStar Hotel Co C Corp
1999 Signature Inns Inc. C Corp Jameson Inns Inc. REIT
1999 Supertel Hospitality Inc. C Corp Humphrey Hospitality Trust Inc. REIT
1999 Vistana Inc. C Corp Starwood Hotel & Resorts REIT
1999 Promus Hotel Corp C Corp Hilton Hotels Corp C Corp
2002 Interstate Hotels Corp C Corp MeriStar Hotels & Resorts Inc. C Corp
* Meditrust Corporation was dropped from the sample because of the insufficient data for the estimation period.
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3.5: Research Methodology 
 
This study used Eventus Software (Cowan, 2010) to analyze data, in which normal returns were 
estimated using a per-event period sample with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The CRSP Value 
Weighted Index was used as the market benchmark. The estimation window comprised of 200 days, 
starting -250 days and ending -51 days prior to the merger announcement date.  The event window was 
defined as 30 days prior to and 30 days after each announcement. 
 
This chapter employs exactly the same event study methodology and statistical tests, which are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis; and therefore, not described here again.  
 
 
 
3.6: Empirical Results 
 
3.6.1.  Hypothesis  1:  Acquirers’  Returns   
The test results for the C –Corporation  acquirers’  cumulative  average  abnormal  return  (CAAR)  are  
summarized in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1 shows the graphical representation. These results are based on 
the Market Adjusted Return Model with the CRSP Value Weighted Index as a benchmark. Table 3.2 
shows that from (-30, -2) days the C-Corporations actually gained about CAAR of 7% (also shown with a 
dotted circle in the graph) and the results were statistically significant at the 0.1 level for the Patell and 
CDA tests. Detailed results are included in Appendix 3.   
 
The reason for this abnormally positive return for (-30,-2) days was primarily due to three companies: La 
Quinta Inns Inc. (27.57% at 0.01 significance level), Doubletree Corporation (12.42%, not significant), 
and MeriStar Hotels and Resorts (54.32% at 0.05 significance level). These companies probably have had 
other significant events that led to such an increase in the stock price.  
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Table 3.2: CAAR for Acquirers that were C-Corporations (N = 9) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z 
StdCsect 
Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
(-30,-2) 7.01% 6.00% 4:05 1.342$ 0.983 1.323$ 1.021 
(-1,-1) 0.07% 0.12% 3:06 0.146 0.144 0.074 -0.461 
(0,+1) -5.53% -4.57% 1:8< -3.889*** -1.785* -3.974*** -1.836* 
(+2,+30) 0.31% 0.25% 5:04 0.056 0.079 0.059 0.167 
 
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, 
using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, 
<, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less 
than in the parameter estimation period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation 
period. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: C-Corporations as Acquirers CAAR 
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Table 3.3 shows the CAAR for C-Corporation acquirers without La Quinta, Doubletree and MeriStar and 
that  of  the  REIT  acquirers’  is  shown  in  Table  3.4.    The  hypothesis  1  stated  that  the  M&A transactions 
would have greater negative impact on REIT acquirers than that on the C-Corporation acquirers because 
REIT acquirers typically pay more than the traditional C-Corporation; was rejected (Figure 3.2). During 
the (-30, +30) event window, the shareholders of the C-Corporation acquirers lost 11.95% of their 
wealth while that for the REIT acquirers lost 8.06% of their wealth.  
 
One possible reason could be the sampling bias. The 12 out of 16 selected M&A transactions were 
completed before the REIT Reform Act of 1998. Before this legislation was passed, a few REITs such as 
Starwood, Patriot American, had a significant economic advantage due to their grandfathered paired-
share status that enabled them to make up for the higher premium paid.  However, it is important to 
note that only two transactions in the sample involved paired-share REIT acquirers.    
 
 
Table 3.3: CAAR for Acquirers that were C-Corporations (N = 6) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z 
StdCsect 
Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank 
Test Z 
(-30,-2) -5.21% -4.58% 1:5( -0.907 -2.723** -0.923 -0.555 
(-1,-1) 0.29% 0.49% 2:04 0.526 0.438 0.276 -0.126 
(0,+1) -4.67% -4.44% 1:5( -3.346*** -1.355$ -3.150*** -1.735* 
(+2,+30) -2.37% -3.03% 3:03 -0.601 -0.946 -0.419 -0.279 
 
 
Table 3.4: CAAR for Acquirers that were REITs (N = 7) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
(-30,-2) -2.52% -1.96% 3:04 -0.475 -0.409 -0.604 -0.247 
(-1,-1) 0.24% 0.05% 2:05 0.065 0.084 0.316 -0.162 
(0,+1) -0.51% -0.47% 2:05 -0.431 -0.574 -0.468 -0.216 
(+2,+30) -5.23% -5.02% 0:7<< -1.215  -6.929*** -1.256 -0.796 
 
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, 
using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, 
<, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less 
than in the parameter estimation period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation 
period. 
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Figure 3.2: Acquirers' Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6.2.  Hypothesis  2:  Targets’  Returns   
As hypothesized, targets of the REIT acquirers benefited more than targets of the C-Corporation 
acquirers (Figure 3.3). The (-30, +30) days total CAAR for the targets of hotel REITs was 15.82% as 
compared with 9.73% for the targets of hotel C-Corporations. For both, the maximum excess returns 
were generated on the day of and the day after the announcement and the results were statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level for Patell and CDA tests and at the 0.10 level for the non-parametric rank 
test (Table 3.5 and Table 3.6). Detailed results are included in Appendix 4.   
 
The lower CAAR for +2 to +30 days was not found to be statistically significant. A low and/or negative 
CAAR in the period following M&A announcements could be due the overbidding of stocks immediately 
following the announcement and then following to a new equilibrium, level.  
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Table 3.5: CAAR for Targets of C-Corporation Acquirers (N = 6) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z 
StdCsect 
Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank 
Test Z 
(-30,-2) -0.45% -2.95% 2:04 -0.479 -0.489 -0.072 -0.937 
(-1,-1) 1.32% 1.55% 3:03 1.357$ 0.824 1.135 0.585 
(0,+1) 8.26% 6.50% 4:02 4.012*** 1.031 5.015*** 1.439$ 
(+2,+30) 0.59% -1.16% 2:04 -0.188 -0.338 0.095 0.031 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6: CAAR for Targets of REIT Acquirers (N = 9) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z 
StdCsect 
Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank 
Test Z 
(-30,-2) 8.08% 7.75% 6:03 1.433$ 1.768* 1.301$ 1.108 
(-1,-1) 0.51% -0.01% 4:05 -0.014 -0.013 0.446 -0.224 
(0,+1) 8.81% 6.08% 6:03 4.283*** 1.616$ 5.405*** 1.301$ 
(+2,+30) -1.56% -1.90% 5:04 -0.35 -0.685 -0.251 0.187 
 
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, 
using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, 
<, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less 
than in the parameter estimation period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation 
period. 
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Figure 3.3: Target's Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
 
 
 
3.6.3. Hypothesis 3: Comparison of Merger Portfolios  
The hypothesis that a portfolio consisting of hotel REIT acquirers and their targets would get higher 
returns when compared with a portfolio comprising of hotel C-Corporations acquirers and their targets, 
was confirmed. Detailed results are included in Appendix 5.   
 
Though for the period after the announcement on (+2, +30) days the portfolio with C-Corporation 
acquirers did slightly better than the portfolio with REIT acquirers, overall the performance of the 
portfolio with REIT acquirers was superior (Table 3.7 and Table 3.8). The event period (-30, +30) days 
total CAAR for the portfolio with REIT acquirers was 2.48% while that for the portfolio with C-
Corporation acquirers was -6.99% (Figure 3.4).  As hypothesized, the excess positive returns accrued to 
the targets of REIT acquirers would more than compensate for the negative returns accrued to their 
acquirers. In addition, since the hypothesis 1 that C-Corporation acquirers would do better than their 
REIT counterparts was rejected, the difference between CAARs of the two portfolios was furthered 
pronounced.  
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Table 3.7: CAAR for a Portfolio with C-Corporation Acquirers (N =6) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z 
StdCsect 
Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank 
Test Z 
(-30,-2) -3.80% -3.67% 1:5( -0.832 -1.960* -0.78 -0.948 
(-1,-1) 0.46% 0.82% 3:03 0.997 0.816 0.508 0.531 
(0,+1) -2.32% -2.75% 3:03 -2.374** -1.313$ -1.809* -1.091 
(+2,+30) -1.37% -2.34% 3:03 -0.53 -0.848 -0.28 -0.441 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.8: CAAR for a Portfolio with REIT Acquirers (N = 6) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z 
StdCsect 
Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank 
Test Z 
(-30,-2) 1.38% 0.83% 3:03 0.211 0.213 0.337 0.817 
(-1,-1) 0.42% 0.14% 3:03 0.194 0.19 0.557 0.042 
(0,+1) 2.22% 1.05% 4:02 1.018 0.475 2.058* 0.16 
(+2,+30) -1.54% -1.59% 2:04 -0.408 -1.167 -0.374 -0.058 
 
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, 
using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, 
<, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less 
than in the parameter estimation period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation 
period. 
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of CAARs for Merger Portfolios  
 
 
 
3.7: Conclusion 
  
The primary goal of this thesis is to understand whether the REIT structure is an efficient organization 
form for the lodging industry and whether the tax benefits of REIT offset its regulatory constraints. REITs 
fuel their growth mainly through acquisitions, and therefore a study of REIT structure in M&A settings is 
important. To that extent, this chapter conducted an event study to examine the stock market reaction 
to merger and acquisition announcements in the lodging industry, based on corporate structure.  
 
Contrary to the findings of Yang et al. (2010), the results of this event study showed that the hotel REIT 
acquirers do increase shareholder wealth. It was observed that both, REIT bidders and their targets 
fared better than C-Corporation bidders and their targets. Prior research has shown that REITs typically 
pay higher acquisition premiums than their non-REIT counterparts. Therefore, the result showing higher 
excess returns accrued to the targets of REIT acquirers is not surprising. The intriguing finding, however, 
is that that stock market did not punish REIT acquirers for their overpayments. As discussed in the 
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literature review, possible reasons for positive public market reactions could be (a) REITs face regulatory 
time constraints to deploy capital quickly; (b) the higher present value of future management fees, 
provide incentives to REIT manager to investment in real estate with less concern for acquisition costs; 
(c) tax benefits of the REIT status.  
 
Though the findings of this event showed that in merger and acquisition deals hotel REITs do have 
advantages over hotel C-Corporations, one should be aware of the limitations of this study. First, one of 
the chief shortcomings of this event study is its small sample size. Future research on this topic could 
eliminate this issue by looking at acquisition of individual properties or assets as opposed to entire 
companies. Second, this research was focused only on short-term performance of mergers and 
acquisitions. Given the illiquidity of real estate assets and higher transaction costs, it would be useful to 
compare the post-merger long-term performance of REITs and C-Corporations.  
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CHAPTER 4: STOCK RETURNS COMPARISON: HOTEL REITS VS. HOTEL C-CORPORATIONS 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter compares the financial performance of publicly traded hotel REITs and hotel 
C-Corporations. The introduction and the literature review summarize prior research and 
form the basis for the hypothesis and research methodology. Finally, based on the stock 
market performance over the last 20 years, the empirical results indicate whether one 
form of corporate structure fared better than the other.  
 
 
 
 
4.1: Introduction 
 
The previous chapters presented the structural and operating differences between hotel REITs and hotel 
C-Corporations. In this chapter we examine if the public market favors one organizational structure over 
the other by comparing the stock returns of one group against another. A similar study done by Burch 
and Taylor (1996), found that the taxable hotel corporations outperformed the hotel REITs by 
approximately 40% over a three year period (August 1993 to June 1996), in both equally weighted and 
market capitalization weighted indexes. However, a small observation period during the up-cycle and a 
relatively young hotel REIT industry makes this study less reliable. The cyclic nature of the real estate 
and hospitality industry coupled with the changes in the REIT legislature over the past 20 years, calls for 
a reevaluation of stock performance of REITs and C-Corporations in the lodging industry.  
 
 
 
4.2: Literature Review 
 
Giliberto and Sidoroff (1996) compared three real estate indexes: the National Association of Real Estate 
Trusts (NAREIT) Index (market weighted), the Wilshire Real Estate Securities Index (market weighted), 
and the Lehman Brothers Equity REIT Index (log based, equally weighted price only index). The goal of 
this study was to provide institutional investors a framework for choosing an appropriate index. The 
authors note that for market weighted stock and bond indexes are typically used for quantitative asset 
allocation; and recommend the market weighted indexes for their consistency when using real estate 
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stocks as a proxy for commercial real estate or as a sector within the equity market. To compare 
property-type performance, the authors recommend equally weighted index because one or two large 
firms can distort the results of a market weighted index. 
 
Giliberto and Sidoroff conclude that though the three indexes they studied cover the same market 
sector and overlap considerably, differences in construction methodology, entry and exit criteria and 
composition imply that these indexes are not exact substitutes. The authors observed that the NAREIT 
Index and the Wilshire Index are most commonly used indexes but at times this paper comes across as a 
recommendation for the Lehman Brothers Index, and the one of the authors working at Lehman further 
questions the impartiality of the study. 
 
A study conducted by Zhang and Deng (2010) examined the return patterns of the US hotel real estate 
stocks from 1990 to 2007. The authors found that the magnitude and persistence of future mean 
returns of hotel real estate stocks can be predicted based on past returns, past earnings surprise, 
trading volume, firm size, and holding period. The study observed that the earnings momentum effect 
for hotel stocks is more short-lived and smaller in magnitude than the market average. Price momentum 
portfolios (or contrarian portfolios) of big hotel firms underperform small hotel firms and the hotel price 
momentum portfolio significantly underperform the overall market over the intermediate-term and/or 
the long-term.  
 
The authors  maintain  that  overinvestment  in  the  hotel  industry  had  hurt  hotel  stocks’  return  and  
increased their volatility and warn that the fast expansion due to market overreaction will create serious 
financial problems in subsequent recession. They recommend the M&A based growth strategy as 
opposed to expansion by building new properties. In addition, the study recommends caution during 
pursuing new financing activities because such activities not only magnify the financial and market risks 
but also create downward pressure on hotel stocks due to earnings dilution and increased uncertainty. 
Thus, the authors conclude that a conservative hotel growth strategy accompanied by an internal-
oriented financing policy is proper in a period of prosperity. The authors mention the small sample pool 
and the sample period coinciding with up-cycle as the limiting factors and maintain that the 
explanations and conclusions of their study are only suggestive. 
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In summary, prior studies comparing the total returns of hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporations is very 
limited. Only one study (Burch and Taylor, 1996) constructed indexes to study the stock market 
perception of hotel REITs and their C-Corporation counterparts. However, a small observation period of 
less than 3 years during the up-cycle and a relatively young hotel REIT industry makes this study less 
reliable. Thus, this thesis proposes a reevaluation of stock performance of REITs and C-Corporations in 
the lodging industry.  
 
 
 
4.3: Hypothesis 
 
Assuming that the markets are efficient, all the available information would be reflected in the stock 
price. Given, the benefits of a REIT status, new forms of REIT, and the constant lobbying efforts aimed to 
ease the regulatory constraints, the stock market should anticipate these advantages and accordingly: 
 
H1:  returns of hotel REITs would outperform the stock returns of hotel C-Corporations in the 
market capitalization weighted index  
 
H2:  returns of hotel REITs would outperform the stock returns of hotel C-Corporations in the 
equally weighted index 
 
 
 
4.4: Data Collection  
 
The search for already existing indexes for comparing returns of hotel REITs with that of hotel C-
Corporations proved to be futile. The Standard and Poor's Hotel/Motel Index has long been 
discontinued while the recently introduced Baird/STR Hotel Stock Index combines hotel REITs and hotel 
C-Corporations. In addition, the Baird/STR Hotel Stock index includes pure operating companies such as 
Marriott International, which do not own any real assets. Therefore, the Baird/STR Hotel Stock Index 
doesn’t  serve the purpose of this study either (Baird/STR Hotel Stock Index, n.d.). Since the exiting 
indexes  can’t  be  used  to  compare  the  stock  returns  of  hotel  REITs  and  hotel C-Corporations, we created 
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our own market capitalization weighted and equally weighted indexes based on the total monthly 
returns for a period from August 1993 to December 2011. The observation periods starts in August 
1993, when the first hotel REIT went public (RFS Hotel Investors, NYSE: RFS). 
 
Both, hotel REITS (SIC Code: 6798) and C-Corporations (SIC Code: 7011) were identified using Capital IQ 
database for business descriptions.  The monthly closing share prices, total returns, dividends, shares 
outstanding for the period from August 1993 to December 2011 were obtained from the CRSP via WRDS 
database. Table 1 provides the list of companies that were selected for this comparative study. 
 
The goal of this thesis is to study corporate structures prevailing in the hospitality industry and identify 
an efficient structure, if any, for ownership and management of hotels. Therefore, only those hotel C-
Corporations that closely resemble hotel REITs were selected. The hotel C-Corporations that derive their 
income purely from managing and or franchising hotels (e.g. Choice Hotels, NYSE: CHH) were omitted.  
In addition, companies that operated primarily in allied sectors such as gaming, casinos (e.g. Wynn 
Resorts, NASDAQ GS: WYNN) and/or entertainment (Marcus Corporation, NYSE: MCS) were ignored as 
well.   
 
REITs have to distribute 90% of their taxable income and consequently, they pay relatively large 
dividends. As a result, there is a substantial difference between the price returns and the total returns 
for REITs. So comparing price returns of REITs with that of the C-Corporations  wouldn’t  have  been  
rational and therefore, the indexes were created based on the total returns only. The monthly returns 
obtained from the CRSP database are total returns or holding period returns from month-end to month-
end, not compounded from daily returns, and ordinary dividends are reinvested at month-end.  
The most common stock indexes, a market capitalization weighted total return index and an equally 
weighted total return index, were created for each group of companies. All the indexes have an initial 
value of 100 as of August 6, 1993. A few companies such as Starwood Hotels, and Host Hotels, changed 
their corporate structure during the observation period, thus these companies are moved from one 
group to another based on the information collected from their annual 10-K reports8.  
 
 
                                                             
8 The companies were eliminated from the respective indexes as of their restructuring announcement and 
introduced back when the conversion was completed.  
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Table 4.1: Index Constituents 
 
 
 
 
4.4: Research Methodology 
 
4.4.1. Market Capitalization Weighted Indexes 
A market capitalization or market value weighted index is an index where each firm is weighted 
according to its market capitalization, so that the larger firms carry a larger percentage weighting. 
Majority of the broad market indexes are market capitalization weighted such as S&P 500, NASDAQ, 
Wilshire, and the Baird/STR Hotel Stock Index.  
 
To construct a market capitalization weighted index, monthly index returns were calculated by 
multiplying  each  company’s  monthly total return by its market capitalization for that month. The sum of 
the products was then divided by the total market capitalization for all the companies in the index that 
month (equation 1).  The market capitalization or the equity value of each firm was calculated as the 
number of outstanding shares at the end of each month, multiplied by the closing price of the stock for 
each month. The market capitalization weighted indexes were rebalanced each month based on 
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changes in the market capitalization of each company relative to the total market capitalization 
represented by the index as well as to account for any new listing or delisting. 
    
𝑰𝒕   =    𝑰𝒕ି𝟏   ∗    ቈ  𝟏   +  
∑ ൫𝑹𝒙,𝒕   ∗   𝑴𝑪𝒙,𝒕൯𝒏𝒙ୀ𝟏
∑ 𝑴𝑪𝒙,𝒕𝒏𝒙ୀ𝟏
  ቉         
………………..Equation  1 
Where,           
It = Index value at month t 
It-1 = Index value at month t-1 
Rx,t = Total stock return for firm x for the period t-1 to t 
n = Number of firms included in the index at month t 
MCx,t  = Market Capitalization (equity market value) of firm x at month t; and   
 
𝑀𝐶௫,௧   =   𝑃௫,௧   ∗   𝑁௫,௧ 
Px,t = Closing stock price for firm x at month t 
Nx,t = Number of shares outstanding for firm x at month t  
 
Advantages  Disadvantages  
- The index roughly reflects the overall stock 
market (though the large companies are 
heavily weighted, they also have the large 
shareholder bases) 
- Rebalancing of the index is simple (a stock 
reweights itself as its price changes) 
 
- This index can present a distorted view of 
the market because any big movements in 
the stock price of large companies can 
have a dramatic effect on the value of the 
index 
- Over the short term, the index tends to 
own too much of the overpriced stocks 
and too little of the bargain priced stocks, 
if there are any.  
- Less diversification (putting too much 
money in a few firms) 
Source: Investopedia, the Value Weighted Index and Russell Research 
 
 
59 
The market capitalization weighted indexes are widely used, they have some inherent flaws.  In these 
types of indexes, the performance of the index is greatly influenced by a few large firms and may not 
provide an accurate picture of the overall market. Therefore, one needs to be aware of the relative 
weightings of the firms included in an index (Giliberto and Sidroff, 1996). 
 
 
4.4.2. Equally Weighted Indexes 
The equally weighted index weights each firm equally regardless of its market capitalization or economic 
size (sales, earnings, book value). Thus, it is simply an arithmetic average of all the companies included 
in the index.  Examples of equally weighted indexes include some indexes by MSCI and Russell. 
 
To construct an equally weighted index, monthly index returns were calculated as the arithmetic 
average of the monthly total returns for all of the companies included in the index (equation 2). In the 
equally-weighted index the same amount is initially invested in each stock and it is not rebalanced with 
respect to the market capitalization. However, the index is rebalanced each month to account for 
account for any new listing or delisting. 
 
𝑰𝒕   =    𝑰𝒕ି𝟏   ∗    ቈ  𝟏   +  
∑ 𝑹𝒙,𝒕𝒏𝒙ୀ𝟏
𝒏𝒕
  ቉         
………………..Equation  2 
Where,           
It = Index value at month t 
It-1 = Index value at month t-1 
Rx,t = Total stock return for firm x for the period t-1 to t 
nt = Number of firms included in the index at month t 
 
 
The equally-weighted index provides an equal exposure to every size of firms in the index and as a 
result, it measures the performance of the average firm in the group. Since the value of the index is not 
heavily influenced by the large firms, the equally weighted index can reveal trends within a particular 
sector (Giliberto and Sidroff 1996). 
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Advantages  Disadvantages  
- High diversification (all firms in the index 
equally weighted and thereby eliminate 
the risk of putting too much money in a 
few firms) 
- The index does not overweight overpriced 
stocks and underweight underpriced 
stocks.  
- It is difficult to maintain equal weights for 
all the firms in the index, because stock 
prices fluctuate daily making over 
allocation to stocks which have increased 
in price, and vice-a versa.  This makes 
constant rebalancing of the index 
necessary to maintain equal weights.  
 
Source: Investopedia, the Value Weighted Index and Russell Research 
 
 
 
4.5: Empirical Results 
 
4.5.1. Market Capitalization Weighted Index vs. Equally Weighted Index 
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show the resulting market capitalization weighted index against the equally 
weighted index for REITs and C-Corporations respectively. For hotel REITs the equally weighted index 
outperformed the market capitalization weighted index (Figure 4.1) while the exact opposite trend was 
observed for hotel C-Corporations (Figure 4.2).  
 
For REITs, the market capitalization weighted index has a monthly mean total return of $381.63, 
compared to $447.42 for the equally weighted index. Dash and Zeng (2010) of Standard and Poor's 
observed that the S&P 500 equal weighted index outperformed the S&P 500 during bear markets and 
underperformed during strong markets. However, figure 4.1  doesn’t  show  such  trend.  Dash  and Zeng 
also suggested that when value stocks outperform growth stocks, the S&P 500 equal weighted index 
outperformed the S&P 500.  Though the identification of value stocks and growth stocks for the hotel 
REITs is beyond the scope of this study; this could be one of the reasons for the trends observed in 
Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Hotel REIT Indexes 
 
 
Another study conducted by Plyakha et al. (2012), concluded that the higher alpha of the equally 
weighted portfolio along with its higher exposure to the market, size and value risk factors are the 
reasons behind the outperformance of the equally weighted portfolio over the value and price weighted 
portfolios. Furthermore, the authors maintain that the monthly rebalancing of the equally weighted 
portfolio benefits from the reversal, idiosyncratic volatility and the lead lag characteristics of stock 
returns at the monthly frequency.   
 
For C-Corporations, the market capitalization weighted index outperformed the equally weighted index. 
The market capitalization weighted index has a monthly mean total return of $395.10, compared to 
$181.19 for the equally weighted index. This trend is due to the fact that the market capitalization 
weighted index has been influenced heavily by a single or a few firms. For instance, in September 1993, 
Hilton alone accounted for 88% of the index, while the remaining 4 firms contributed only 12%. In 
November 1998, only 3 firms contributed 82% of the index while the remaining 10 firms contributed 
only 18%. This trend shows that overall the large cap hotel C-Corporations such as Starwood, Wyndham 
performed better than their small and/or medium cap counterparts such as Red Lion, Prime Hotels.  
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Figure 4.2: Hotel C-Corporation Indexes 
 
 
4.5.2. Hypothesis 1: Market Capitalization Weighted Index 
Contrary to the initial hypothesis, hotel REITs did not outperform hotel C-Corporations in the market 
capitalization weighted index over the stated observation period (Figure 4.3). The performance of REITs 
and C-Corporations has been almost identical with brief periods of one beating the other by a narrow 
margin. There were, however, two phases when the performance of the two was noticeably different.   
 
Over the period from mid-1995 through mid-1998 (showed with a dotted circle in Figure 4.3), the hotel 
REITs dominated the hotel C-Corporations. Though the overreliance of the market capitalization 
weighted index on a few, large companies have been commonly cited as a flaw, it actually allowed us to 
see the unfair economic advantages of a paired-share REIT structure, which led to the REIT Reformation 
Act of 1998. This trend is not distinguishable in the equally weighted index (Figure 4.4). For instance, out 
of the 15 REITs included in the index in August 1998, only 3 REITs accounted for almost 69% of the index.  
These three REITs were the grandfathered paired-share REITs - Starwood, Patriot American and La 
Quinta.  In fact, Starwood alone accounted for almost 40% of the index for many months during this 
period.  
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Figure 4.3: Market Capitalization Weighted Index 
 
 
An opposite trend was observed for a period from mid-2009 through the end of 2011 (showed with a 
dash-dot circle in Figure 4.3), when again owing to the performance of a single or a few large firms, the 
hotel C-Corporations surpassed the hotel REITs. The main value driver was once again Starwood, which 
on an average accounted for 55% of the index, followed by Wyndham averaging at 28%. One possible 
reason for the superior performance of C-Corporations could be that both Starwood and Wyndham 
have been moving towards a lighter business model- management of hotels as opposed to owing of 
hotels, which is a capital intensive business. Unlike REITs, the C-Corporations do have higher retained 
earnings and do not depend primarily on debt to fuel their growth. Though the entire lodging industry 
suffered in the recent downturn, the highly leveraged balance sheets, approaching debt maturities and a 
tight credit market probably caused the shares of REITs to fall more than the C-Corporations.   
 
In addition, the results also showed that for the most part, hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporations 
outperformed the overall market, in this case the S&P 500 index. The only periods when the hospitality 
stocks underperformed the S&P 500, were during the dot-com bust and at the height of the recent 
recession.  
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4.5.3. Hypothesis 2: Equally Weighted Index 
The hypothesis that the hotel REITs would outperform the hotel C-Corporations did hold true in the 
equally weighted index (Figure 4.4). In addition, there was a substantial difference between the values 
of the REIT index and the C-Corporation index but the REIT index was more volatile.  
 
The better performance of hotel REITs can possibly be explained by the fact that the equally weighted 
index assigns equal weights to all of its constituents and no few large firms can dominate the value of 
the index. Therefore, if a number of smaller firms outperform their larger counterparts, the resulting 
value of the index will be higher. This indeed was the case in the equally weighted hotel REITs index. For 
instance, the average monthly total returns for large REITs such as Host Hotels was 1.09%, compared 
with small and/or medium size REITs such as LaSalle Hotels at 1.51% or Ashford Hospitality at 1.70%.  In 
contrast, the value of equally weighted index for hotel C-Corporations was much lower because the 
large firms got weighted equally with the smaller ones. For example, the average monthly total returns 
for large hotel C-Corporations were much higher (E.g. Starwood: 1.08%, Wyndham: 2.81%) than that of 
the small and/or mid-size firms (E.g. Orient Express: 0.33%, Red Lion: 0.36%).  
 
High leverage of REITs can explain the higher volatility of the REIT returns. Li (2012) concluded that REIT 
return volatility increases with leverage, inflation and trading volume. In another research paper 
published by RREEF (the real estate division of Deutsche Bank), poor liquidity of public REITs was cited as 
the main culprit. The increase in the mergers and acquisition activity, an ever increasing participation 
from large-cap funds along with their resulting frequent capital flows were also listed as the factors that 
cause larger price swings.  
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Figure 4.4: Equally Weighted Index 
 
 
 
4.6: Conclusion 
 
A review of the monthly total returns of hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporations for a period from August 
1993 through December 2011, provided contrasting results based on the market capitalization weighted 
index and equally weighted index. The initial hypothesis that the tax benefits of hotel REITs would offset 
the regulatory constraints on their generation and distribution of income, and thus their stock returns 
would surpass those of the hotel C-Corporations was only partially validated.  When the total returns 
were tracked on a market capitalization basis, the performance of hotel REITs was almost identical to 
that of hotel C-Corporations. Since the market capitalization weighted index is the most widely used 
index and is typically reflective of the overall market, one can infer that there are no significant benefits 
to REITs in the lodging industry.   
 
However, the market capitalization index can produce distorted results because of its heavy reliance on 
a few large constituents. Therefore the equally weighted index, which is reflective of the performance of 
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the average firm in the group, was created as well. When weighted equally, hotel REITs did outperform 
hotel C-Corporations by a substantial margin. In addition, the equally weighted index revealed the 
higher volatility of hotel REITs, which was not as apparent in the market capitalization weighted index. 
Apart from the tax benefits of REITs, one reason for their stellar performance could be that a large 
number of smaller REITs outperformed their few larger counterparts. In case of the C-Corporations, the 
roles were reversed with large cap firms faring better.  
 
To summarize, this event study showed that small hotel REITs performed better than their larger 
counterparts, and the performance of large hotel C-Corporations was superior to their smaller 
counterparts, over the sample period.  In  addition,  this  study  also  showed  that  hotel  REITs’  returns  are  
highly volatile.  
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDIES 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
This is two part case study section that examines specific hospitality firms that have 
undergone substantial changes in their corporate structure or innovated new 
organizational forms. Specifically, this includes the following case studies – (A) Starwood 
Hotels and Resorts, Inc.; and (B) MeriStar Hospitality Trust. The goal is to understand 
whether such moves were (i) motivated by the prospects of improved profitability; (ii) 
forced due to legislative changes; or (iii)   made   necessary   by   the   change   in   a   firm’s  
business strategy.  
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5. A. CASE STUDY: STARWOOD HOTELS AND RESORTS WORLDWIDE, INC. (NYSE: HOT) 
 
 
 
A.1: Introduction 
 
In  less  than  20  years,  Starwood  has  evolved  from  being  an  almost  bankrupt  firm  to  the  world’s  largest  
hospitality company.  Starwood is particularly important in the context of this thesis since Starwood was 
once a grandfathered paired–share REIT and changed its corporate structure over the years to its 
current form, a C-Corporation. This case study is organized around these corporate restructuring events 
(Figure A.1): 
I. 1994-1998: Grandfathered Paired-share REIT 
II. 1999-2006: A C-Corporation with the REIT as a Subsidiary  
III. 2006-2012: The C-Corporation   
 
Figure A.1: Historical Performance of Starwood 
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A.2: Company History 
 
Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide, Inc. is the eventual successor of businesses once operated as 
Hotel Investors Trust (NYSE: HOT) and Hotel Investors Corporation (NYSE: HIC). The Hotel Investors Trust 
(Trust) was founded in 1969 as a hotel REIT that invested in fee, ground leasehold and mortgage loan 
interests in hotel properties across the United States. In 1980, the Trust formed the Hotel Investors 
Corporation (Corporation) and began leasing the Trust's hotels to the Corporation. The shares of the 
Trust and that of the Corporation  were  “paired” on a one-for-one basis.  Though the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 1984 prohibits the "pairing" of a REIT's stock with the stock of an operating company, the Trust 
could maintain its paired-share structure because it was in place before the new legislation was passed.  
 
An overleveraged balance sheet coupled with overbuilding and the S&L crisis negatively impacted the 
Trust.  By  1991  the  Trust  was  unable  to  generate  sufficient  cash  flows  to  service  its  debt,  didn’t  pay  
dividends and came on the brink of bankruptcy (Figure A.2).  On June 13, 1994, the Trust and the 
Corporation entered in to an agreement with Starwood Capital Group leading to the formation of 
Starwood Lodging Trust (REIT) and Starwood Lodging Corporation (C-Corp). 
 
 
Figure A.2: Hotel Investor Trust (HOT) Stock Price 
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Part A-I. 1994-1998: Grandfathered Paired-share REIT 
 
This period marked the rapid growth of Starwood and it emerged as a leading force in the hospitality 
industry.  By 1994 the demand in the hospitality sector was steadily increasing while the overbuilding of 
the late 80s and early 90s had choked the new supply pipeline.  The passage of the Revenue 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 amended the "Five or Fewer" rule and made it easier for pension plans to 
invest in REITs. Thus, Starwood greatly benefited from increasing capital flow and the improving market 
conditions.  In addition, Starwood was the only public REIT with the benefit of a paired-share REIT status 
and could eliminate the issues related to leakage and conflicts of interest. Starwood’s  strategy  of  
growing through acquisitions of assets at prices below their replacement costs, rather than building new 
properties further promoted its rapid growth.  
 
 
A-I.1. Starwood Capital Group, L.P.  
In 1991 Barry Sternlicht founded a real estate private investment firm, Starwood Capital Group L.P 
(Starwood). Though initially it was focused on multifamily assets, Starwood Capital kicked off its 
investments in the hospitality industry with its purchase of first hotels in 1993. A year later, Starwood 
Capital acquired a majority of the distressed senior debt of Hotel Investors Trust (Trust) and negotiated 
a complete restructuring  agreement  to  create  an  ‘UPREIT’  structure  (Figure  A.3). As a part of the deal, 
Starwood Capital contributed certain hotels and cash in exchange for operating partnership units, 
management and board representation.  Barry Sternlicht, the CEO of Starwood Capital was named a 
trustee and CEO of Starwood Lodging. In addition, the Trust was renamed as Starwood Lodging Trust 
(SLT) and the Corporation as Starwood Lodging Corporation (SLC).  
 
 
A-I.2. Starwood Lodging  
The Trust and the Corporation completed the reorganization with Starwood Capital on January 31, 1995 
(the Closing Date) to form Starwood Lodging. On July 6, 1995, Starwood Lodging completed a public 
offering (the Offering) raised $271 million at a price of $23.00 per Paired-Share. The proceeds from the 
Offering were used to repay the outstanding debts and pursue additional hotel acquisitions.  Just prior 
to the Offering, the Trust and the Corporation completed a reverse stock split in which each six paired-
shares held on the record date for the reverse split were converted into one paired-share. 
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Figure A.3: Starwood Lodging Corporate Structure 
 
 
 
A-I.3. Benefits of Paired-Share Structure 
The restructuring agreement with Hotel Investors Trust proved to be highly advantageous for Starwood 
Lodging (Starwood). Typically, hotel REITs lease their hotels to lessees who either operate the property 
or contract with third-party managers. The REIT receives a percentage of hotel revenue in the form of 
lease  payments.  However,  the  REIT  loses  part  of  hotel’s  operating  profits  to  the  lessee  through  lessee’s  
profit  or  “leakage”.  The "paired-share" structure also allowed Starwood to pay minimal federal tax by 
placing  its  real  estate  in  SLT  (as  a  REIT,  didn’t  pay  taxes)  and  passing  on  a  substantial  portion  of  hotel  
operating  revenue  generated  by  SLC  (a  taxable  C  Corp)  to  SLT  as  ‘lease  payments’.   
 
Though the IRS and Congress quickly recognized the potential for abuse under this structure and revised 
the law in 1984, out of fairness to existing REITs, the legislation "grandfathered" paired-share REITs 
established prior to June 30, 1983.  Starwood could maintain its paired-share structure because it was in 
place before the new legislation was passed.  As a result, Starwood could pay more to acquire a hotel 
than most of its competitors while achieving a higher yield.  Thus, in less than a year after the 
reorganization agreement, Starwood was aggressively acquiring properties.  
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A-I.4. Competition 
Of the four grandfathered paired-share REITs, only one other, Patriot American Hospitality (PAH) which 
went public in September 1995, was in the  hospitality  industry  and  became  Starwood’s  direct  
competitor.  However, by end of 1997, Starwood had made two strategic acquisitions: upscale brand, 
Westin Hotels and ITT Corporation that gave it as edge over Patriot American. Other hotel REITs such as 
Jameson  Inns,  Felcor  Suites,  and  RFS  Hotel  Investors,  didn’t  pay  corporate  taxes  but  these  REITs  couldn’t  
operate the hotels they owned and suffered from the issues related to leakage and conflicts of interest 
with third party operating companies.  Table A.1  shows  Starwood’s  FFO9 multiple compared with its 
peers.  
 
Table A.1: FFO Multiples  
Company  Type  P/FFO 
Jameson Inns  REIT 14.4x 
Felcor Suite Hotels  REIT 12.2x 
RFS Hotel Investors   REIT 10.5x 
Patriot American Hospitality  Paired-share REIT 14.6x 
Starwood Lodging Trust Paired-share REIT 17.2x 
 
 
 
To demonstrate the advantages of a paired-share structure over a REIT, consider the following scenarios 
(Table A.2):  
a. Hotel is owned by a REIT but leased to a third party entity. For example, Jameson Inn 
b. Hotel is owned and operated by a paired-share REIT. For example, Patriot American  
c. Hotel is owned and operated by a paired-share REIT which also owns the hotel brand. For 
example, Starwood 
 
                                                             
9 Funds from Operations (FFO) to is calculated by adding depreciation and amortization expenses to net income, 
and sometimes quoted on a per share basis. The FFO multiple is simply market capitalization divided by FFO. 
Source: Investopedia.   
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Table A.2: Benefits of a Paired-share Status 
 
      
 
Other major companies in the hospitality industry, C-Corporations such as Hilton, Hyatt, and Marriott 
were taxable entities and did not have the economic advantage offered by a paired-share REIT structure.  
In addition, these companies were mostly hotel operating companies and did not own hotels and 
therefore,  comparing  them  with  Starwood  won’t  be  logical.    However,  Starwood  did  perform  better  
than the most hotel owning C-corporations such as Bristol Hotels and Host Marriott (Figure A.4). 
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Figure A.4: Starwood vs. Competition  
 
 
 
A-I.5. Acquisition of the upscale lodging brand- Westin 
At the time of acquisition of the Westin brand, Starwood was paying third-party franchise fees of 2-3% 
of room revenues on its chain affiliated hotels. The acquisition of Westin brand not only saved Starwood 
the franchise fees but also boosted its revenue due  to  brand  recognition  and  access  to  Westin’s  stellar  
management team. With that transaction, Starwood rebranded the operating and management 
company, Starwood Lodging Corporation, as Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide Inc., and likewise 
renamed Starwood Lodging Trust (REIT), as Starwood Hotels and Resorts.  
 
 
A-I.6. Acquisition of ITT Corporation 
On October 20, 1997 Starwood announced the acquisition of ITT Corporation. Hilton had been trying to 
acquire ITT for the last several months and had raised its initial offer from $55/share to $70/share 
matching  ITT’s  self-tender price. However, ITT found a white knight in Starwood which offered 
$82/share. With the acquisition of ITT, Starwood became the largest hotel company worldwide with 650 
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hotels in 70 countries. Starwood also gained two full service lodging brands – Sheraton and Four Points. 
In addition, this acquisition ITT, gave Starwood access to new business, gaming and information services.  
 
 
Figure A.5: ITT Acquisition: Stock Performance of ITT, Starwood, and Hilton 
 
 
It is important to note that Starwood won a bidding war with Hilton Hotels (HLT) primarily because of its 
grandfathered paired-share REIT structure. This acquisition triggered the Congress to reconsider the tax-
breaks for grandfathered paired-share REITs and subsequently, the tax code was amended to end the 
favorable treatment of grandfathered paired-share REITs.  
 
 
 
Part A-II. 1999-2006: A C-Corporation with the REIT as a Subsidiary 
 
The unfavorable change in legislation and consequently the corporate restructuring slowed down 
Starwood’s  aggressive  acquisitions.  In addition, the US economy as a whole faced a variety of 
challenges: the Y2K downturn, the 2001 terrorist attacks, SARS epidemic, the Iraq War. These events 
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further  slowed  down  Starwood’s  growth  (Figure  A.6). However, during 2004-2006, the US lodging 
industry fully recovered with increase in revenue per available room (RevPAR) and occupancy rates.  
 
 
Figure A.6: US Lodging Industry Performance 
 
 
A-II.1. Restructuring Overview 
On July 22, 1998, Congress passed the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 
(1998 Act). Under section 7002: Termination of Exception for Certain Real Estate Investment Trusts from 
the Treatment of Stapled Entities, Congress removed the grandfather protection for stapled entities. The 
1998 Act essentially made it difficult for the sister operating company to operate any new property 
acquired by the REIT. This act treated the income earned by the operating company as income of the 
REIT and as a result, the REIT would lose its status by not satisfying the 70% passive income rule.  
 
This legislation made it difficult for Starwood to acquire and operate additional hotels while still 
maintaining  its  former  status  as  a  ‘grandfathered paired-share real  estate  investment  trust.’ In response 
to this change, on August 26, 1998 Starwood announced its reorganization plan which was approved by 
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the shareholders on January 6, 1999.  As a result of the Restructuring, Starwood was no longer a 
‘grandfathered  paired-share REIT’.    Starwood’s  paired-share structure was converted to a traditional C-
Corporation and the REIT became a wholly owned private subsidiary of the corporation.  For each share 
of the grandfathered paired-share REIT, the shareholders received one share (Class A) in the C-
corporation and one share (Class B) in the REIT subsidiary. However, only Class A shares are publicly 
traded (Figure A.7). 
 
 
Figure A.7: Starwood’s  New  Corporate  Structure 
 
 
A-II.2. Why a C-Corporation with a REIT subsidiary?  
In response to the new REIT reform bill, Starwood would have converted to a (i) traditional REIT with 
third-party or affiliated lessee structure by spinning off or selling its operating and franchise business; (ii) 
C-Corporation and continuing to own and operate its properties but pay corporate taxes; or (iii) C-
Corporation with a REIT subsidiary and minimize taxable income. The option to convert to a REIT with a 
C-Corporation subsidiary was not possible, because the existing regulations at that time prohibited the 
REIT owning 100% of the operating subsidiary.  
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Since  Starwood’s  business  strategy  was  to  own,  operate  and  brand  lodging  assets,  a  C-Corporation with 
a REIT subsidiary was the most viable option. According to La Quinta Corporation (2001) which later 
adopted  the  same  structure  as  Starwood’s,  argued  that  a  C-Corporation with a REIT subsidiary 
essentially allowed a company to expand its lodging franchising program; pay dividends directly to 
shareholders on a tax-efficient basis; maintain the tax deductibility of the preferred dividends; benefit 
from the net operating loss carry-forwards; and continue to align shareholder interest in ownership and 
management of its real estate holdings. 
 
 
Figure A.8: Starwood’s  Simplified  Old  and  New  Corporate  Structures 
Source: PaineWebber Incorporated  
 
 
 
A-II.3. Restructuring Implications  
Since Corporation is not expected to pay dividends, only the holders of the Class B shares received 
dividend through their equity interest in the REIT.  The annual dividend paid to shareholders 
represented approximately 25% of the REITs earnings and the remaining 75% was distributed to the C-
corporation, and the distributed income was then taxed at a rate of 40% on these earnings. As a result, 
the  value  of  Starwood’s  stock  fell  dramatically  since  the  new  reform  act  was  passed  in  July  of  1998  
(Figure A.9).  
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Figure A.9: Starwood’s  Stock Price 
 
 
 
Figure A.10: Starwood’s  Cumulative  Average  Abnormal  Return  (CAAR) 
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However, under the new structure Starwood was still able to prevent the leakage to third-party 
management companies, franchisees or lessees.  In addition, Starwood was able to retain higher 
earnings since as a C-Corporation it was no longer required to distribute 95% of its earnings.  By 
retaining the cash, Starwood was able to reduce its reliance on debt and capital markets to fund growth 
at the same increased its credit profile. As a result, Starwood was able to achieve an investment grade 
debt rating by 2000 and was added to S&P 500 index (Figure A.10)  
 
 
 
Part A-III. 2006-2012: The C-Corporation  
 
In 2005, Starwood announced its plans to reduce investment in owned hotels and increase focus on 
managed and franchise hotels (Figure A.11).  Starwood achieved its new strategy  by  acquiring  the  “Le  
Meridien” brand (help generate franchise royalty fees) and selling 33 owned hotels and the subsidiary 
REIT to Host Marriott.  With this change, Starwood became a peer to the Hilton and Marriott rather than 
to Patriot American  or  Felcor  Suites.  This  move  reduced  Starwood’s  exposure  to  the  cycles  in  real  estate  
and made its business less capital intensive.  
 
 
Figure A.11: Change in Asset Composition 
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A-III.1. the Starwood/Host Hotels Transaction 
On November 14, 2005, Starwood and Host Marriott Corporation (NYSE: HMT) signed a definitive sale 
and purchase agreement whereby Host Marriott acquired 33 properties from in a stock and cash 
transaction. The total value of the transaction was approximately $4.23 billion, including debt 
assumption. Host Marriott also acquired Starwood's subsidiary, Starwood Hotels and Resorts (REIT), 
thereby de-pairing the REIT and C Corp shares. As  a  result,  Starwood’s  effective  tax  rate  increased  to  
35% due to the elimination of its REIT status. Host Marriott became a REIT and subsequently changed 
its name from Host Marriott Corporation to Host Hotels and Resorts, Inc. In addition, Starwood retained 
long-term management and franchise contracts at the hotels sold, on favorable terms that intended to 
provide additional brand control for Starwood.  
 
 
Figure A.12: Starwood and Host Marriott Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) 
 
 
 
A-III.2. Restructuring Implications  
This divestiture was favorable to Starwood due to the debt reduction it offered, which resulted in 
greater  EPS  and  an  investment  grade  rating.  However,  it  was  not  highly  accretive  for  Starwood’s  
shareholders. This transaction was taxable to shareholders upon receipt of the cash/shares as the 
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difference between the market price of the HMT stock received and the Class B Starwood shares was 
treated as capital gains for tax purposes, regardless of whether or not the shareholders choose to 
liquidate their position in the HMT shares.  
 
Starwood’s rapid growth in 1998-2002 was driven more by asset acquisitions than management and 
franchise fee stream growth. Growth through fee streams requires the many more additional rooms 
under management than through an ownership model. Consequently, between 2005 and 2011, 
Starwood added almost 85,000 rooms under management and/or franchise, a 40% increase and was 
able  to  outperform  the  market.  Figure  12  shows  Starwood’s  cumulative  total  stock  returns  as  compared  
against the cumulative total return on the S&P 500 and S&P 500 Hotel Index. 
 
 
Figure A.13: Cumulative Total Stockholder Return 
 
 
 
A.3: Conclusion 
In response to the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Starwood had to give 
up its grandfathered paired-share REIT status and form a C-Corporation. This restructuring was a logical 
step because the new legislation prevented Starwood from operating any new asset acquired. However, 
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Starwood retained the REIT as a subsidiary to the C-Corporation and continued its business strategy of 
acquiring interest in luxury and upscale hotels.   
 
In 2005, Starwood announced a change in its business strategy - reduce investment in owned real estate 
and increase focus on management and franchise business. To achieve this goal Starwood sold its REIT 
subsidiary that owned many of its assets but continued to hold on to certain strategically important real 
estate assets (Figure A.14).  
 
 
Figure A.14: Asset Composition 
 
 
Based on asset composition in Figure A.14, it looks like Starwood was focused on managing and 
franchising business from the start.  However,  after  the  divestiture  a  significant  portion  of  Starwood’s  
revenue was generated through management and franchise fees as opposed to that from the owned 
hotel (Figure A.15).  
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Figure A.15: EBITDA Composition 
 
In summary, the first corporate restructuring was the result of unfavorable change in the REIT 
legislation.  On the other hand, a shift in the business strategy (moving from hotel ownership to hotel 
management) and not necessarily the disadvantages of a REIT status resulted in the second 
restructuring.  
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5. B. CASE STUDY: MERISTAR HOSPITALITY CORPORATION (NYSE: MHX) 
 
 
 
B.1: Introduction 
 
The 1990s saw a wave of consolidation in the lodging industry that was mostly driven by the paired-
share REITs. For instance, Starwood and Patriot American, both paired-share REITs, accounted for 33% 
of the total transaction volume announced in 1997 (Canina et al., 2010). This acquisition spree cooled 
down when the REIT Reform Act of 1998 eliminated the paired-share status that was offered to a select 
few. At the time when the paired-share REIT became history, a new corporate structure was created to 
closely replicate the paired-share structure.   
 
With the merger of American General Hospitality Corporation, a REIT and CapStar Hotel Company, a C-
Corporation; a new company- MeriStar was formed.  MeriStar’s  new  corporate  configuration  allowed  it  
to offset the new regulatory constraints but enjoy the same tax benefits offered by a paired-share REIT 
structure. MeriStar achieved  this  by  creating  a  so  called  “paper-clip” structure and became the first 
entity in the lodging industry to do so. This case study examines the pros and cons of the paper-clip 
structure by tracking the performance of MeriStar from its inception through its privatization in 2006 by 
the Blackstone Group.  
 
 
 
B.2: The Merger 
 
B.2.1. American General Hospitality (NYSE: AGT) 
American General Hospitality Corporation was incorporated on April 12, 1996, as an umbrella 
partnership REIT (UPREIT)10 and went public on July 31, 1996. It was formed as a vehicle for expanding 
the hotel acquisition, development and repositioning operations of American General Hospitality, Inc. 
(‘AGHI’),  a  private  company  founded  in  1981.   
                                                             
10 Please refer to Appendix 6 for a discussion on UPREIT 
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American General Hospitality Corporation (the REIT) did not directly own any hotel assets, but owned 
units in General Hospitality Partnership (the Operating Partnership); which in turn owned the hotels. 
The UPREIT structure allowed the property owners to sell their properties to the REIT without incurring 
a taxable event because they exchanged their assets for units in the operating partnership, rather than 
common shares of the REIT or cash. The partnership units were convertible over time to the common 
shares of REIT and allowed the sellers the flexibility to realize the taxable event when they chose. To 
maintain its REIT status, American General leased its hotels to an AGH Leasing L.P., which in turn 
contracted with American  General  Hospitality,  Inc.  (‘AGHI’)  to  manage  the  hotels  (Figure  B.1).   
 
  
 
Figure B.1: American General Corporate Structure 
Source: American General 10-k and  
The Robinson-Humphrey Company Equity Research, 1997  
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B.2.2. CapStar Hotel Company (NYSE: CHO) 
Founded in 1987, CapStar Hotel Company went public in August 1996. Structured as a C-Corporation, 
CapStar was a leading owner and operator of upscale, full-service hotels in North America. After the IPO, 
CapStar employed an aggressive acquisition strategy and its portfolio grew from 19 hotels in December 
1996 with $105 million of total room revenue to 47 hotels with over $300 million in room revenues by 
December 1997. Figure B.2 compares daily stock returns of CapStar with that of American General (with 
a  starting  value  of  100).  At  the  time  of  CapStar’s  IPO  at  $18.00  a  share,  American  General  was  trading  at  
$17.88 a share but with its ability to acquiring hotels below their replacement costs, renovating and 
repositioning them, CapStar soon surpassed American General (Mutkoski, Mark and Maher, Bryan, 
1997).  
 
 
 
Figure B.2: Daily Stock Returns CapStar vs. American General 
 
 
 
B.2.2. MeriStar 
On March 15, 1998 American General entered into a merger agreement with CapStar and the deal was 
consummated on August 3, 1998. As a part of the transaction, CapStar spun off its hotel management 
business to create a new corporation, MeriStar Hotels and Resorts, Inc. (NYSE: MMH), and then merged 
with American General to form a REIT, MeriStar Hospitality Corporation (NYSE: MHX).  
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Though the deal created the two companies that were independent and traded separately, their 
interests were closely aligned. The shareholders could own stock in both, the REIT and the C-
Corporation; and the companies shared key management positions. In addition, MeriStar Hotels, the 
operating company, had the right of first refusal to lease and manage all hotels acquired by the REIT, 
MeriStar Hospitality (Figure B.3).  According to Roger Cline of Arthur Andersen (1998), this new structure 
tied the two companies together and yet by keeping them separate eliminated problems of the paired-
share REITs.  
 
 
 
Figure B.3: Formation of MeriStar Hospitality 
Source: MeriStar Hospitality 10-k and First Union Securities, Inc., 1999 
 
 
 
Immediately after the merger, the newly formed hotel management C-Corporation, MeriStar Resorts 
acquired  American  Hospitality’s  affiliates  - AGH Leasing L.P. and American General Hospitality, Inc. 
(Figure B.3). Thus, MeriStar Resorts became the lessee and manager of all of the hotels previously 
leased by AGH Leasing and also acquired the right of first refusal to become the lessee of hotels 
acquired in the future by MeriStar Hospitality, the REIT.  
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B.3: The  ‘Paper-Clip’  Structure 
 
B.3.1: Overview 
The  ‘paper-clip’ structure mainly refers to inter-company agreements between MeriStar Hospitality (the 
REIT hotel owner) and MeriStar Hotels and Resorts (the C Corp hotel operator) giving the operating 
company a right of first refusal to lease any hotel that the REIT acquired and the REIT got the right of 
first refusal to acquire hotels presented by the operating company. The two companies also shared the 
important management and board positions such as the CEO and the Chairman. Therefore, an investor 
was  able  to  recreate  the  ‘paired-share’  structure  because  he/she  could  own  both  stocks  to  capture  the  
leakage (profits loss to third-party hotel managers)  and  benefit  from  REIT’s  tax  benefits.  In addition, the 
intercompany agreements aligned the interests of both hotel owner and manager.  
Below are the key features of the intercompany agreement between MeriStar Hospitality and MeriStar 
Resorts:  
- MeriStar Resorts was given a right of first refusal to lease and manage any hotel that MeriStar 
Hospitality acquires 
- MeriStar Resorts was prohibited from making real estate investments, without first providing 
MeriStar Hospitality with the opportunity to do so 
- MeriStar Hospitality was obligated to lend MeriStar Resorts up to $75 million under a revolving 
credit agreement that carried an interest rate of LIBOR plus 350 bps 
 
 
All but four hotels owned by MeriStar Hospitality were leased and managed by MeriStar Resorts, 
generating over 90% of its revenue. Thus, MeriStar Resorts was highly dependent upon the performance 
of MeriStar Hospitality.  As a lessee, MeriStar Resorts had the risk of growing operating costs and an 
obligation to make minimum lease payments to MeriStar Hospitality despite the performance of the 
hotels. However, its role as a hotel operator was more profitable and less risky. Under its management 
contracts,  MeriStar  earned  a  management  fee  as  a  percentage  of  the  hotel’s  total  revenue  and  incentive  
fee based on profit growth. The REIT Modernization Act that became effective in 2001 gave the 
company an opportunity to convert its lease agreements to management contracts.   
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B.3.2: Pros  and  Cons  of  a  ‘Paper-clip’  Structure 
Advantages  
• Tax advantages and dividends associated with a REIT 
• Capture hotel management fees and lease leakage through the operating company, 
which otherwise would have gone to third-party contractors 
• Flexibility to own either the REIT or the operating company, or both 
• Option to own both real estate and operations through a vehicle that aligns interests of 
the operating company with that of the REIT 
• Sharing of several key members between the hotel operator and the owner, allows the 
REIT to directly influence and actively oversee operations of the hotels it owns 
 
Disadvantages  
• Not all shareholders of the REIT own equity in the operating company and vice-a-versa. 
Since each board and management team has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests 
of its shareholders and not the combined companies; sharing of several senior members 
of management and board can lead to potential conflicts of interest. For example, the 
REIT’s decision to sell an asset could be influenced by the loss of leasing and operating 
income of the operating company. On the other hand, REIT could structure leases so as 
to divert as much rental income to the REIT as possible to maximize the tax benefits.  
• The operating company can pursue management contracts for hotels that are in direct 
competition with hotels owned by the REIT 
 
 
B.3.3: Comparison of Paper-clip and Paired-share Structure 
A paper-clip REIT is similar to a paired-share REIT in that it aligns the interests of a C-Corporation (hotel 
operator) and a REIT (hotel owner). In a paired-share REIT, both companies trade as a single unit while in 
a paper-clip REIT, the two companies are trade separately but have close ties. The two companies are 
‘paper-clipped’  together  through  an  intercompany agreement and also share certain senior members of 
management and board members (Figure B.4). According a Coopers Lybrand report commissioned by 
CapStar  and  American  General,  “compared to a paired-share REIT, a paper clip REIT: 1) costs significantly 
less to institute; 2) offers significantly easier tax-free acquisitions of corporate targets; and 3) enables 
investors to invest independently in two different entities, according to their investment objectives.” 
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Figure B.4: Paper-clip REIT vs. Paired-share REIT 
 
 
 
B.4: REIT Modernization Act (RMA) of 1999 
 
To maintain a REIT status, hotel REITs were required to lease their properties to third parties and 
received a percentage of the total property-level revenues. This requirement was eased by the REIT 
Modernization Act of 1999 (RMA), which became effective starting 2001. Under this act, hotel REITs 
were allowed to create a taxable REIT subsidiary (TRS) that could hold the leases then owned by the 
third-party lessee. Thus, a REIT could buy its leases from its lessees and then lease them to its TRS. The 
TRS would then make lease payments to the REIT.  
 
However, the law required the TRS to enter into third party management contracts with hotel operating 
companies,  thus  prohibiting  the  TRS  from  operating  the  REIT’s  hotels.  It  also  prevented  the  TRS  from  
owning a brand or franchise under which hotels are operated. In addition, the legislation reduced the 
dividend distribution requirement for REITs from 95% to 90% of taxable net income. Since the time 
when the RMA was approved, MeriStar Hospitality (REIT) did better than MeriStar Resorts (C Corp), 
because it could manage its own properties better (Figure B.5).  However, the graph also shows that an 
 
92 
investor would have been better off holding both stocks, because it would have allowed the investor to 
take advantage of the paper-clip structure. 
 
 
  
 
Figure B.5:  Monthly  Returns  of  the  “Paper-clipped”  Entities (separate and as a portfolio of both*) 
*Market cap weighted portfolio  
 
 
 
 
After the RMA became effective, MeriStar Hospitality purchased the leases back from its affiliate lessee, 
MeriStar Resorts and leased them to its TRSs (Figure B.6). Thus, its contract with MeriStar Resorts was 
converted into pure management contracts. As a result, MeriStar Hospitality started reporting the 
revenue and operating expenses of its hotels in its financial statements, while before the RMA, MeriStar 
Hospitality only reported rental income and was chiefly focused on lease payments increased with 
revenues. The RMA allowed MeriStar Hospitality to manage its properties better by streamlining its 
operating costs as well. However, this exposure to the operating costs made MeriStar Hospitality riskier. 
As mentioned above, before the RMA, the lessee was exposed to the potential increases in operating 
costs such as wages, utility etc., now that risk was transferred to MeriStar Hospitality.  
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Figure B.6: MeriStar's Structure 2001-2006 
 
 
 
B.5: Competition 
 
MeriStar Hospitality was a pure hotel property owner REIT with neither operational activities nor an 
ownership  of  a  brand  or  franchise  business.  The  REIT’s  close  affiliation  with  the  hotel  operating  
company, MeriStar Resorts made in unique in the lodging industry.    As  discussed  above,  MeriStar’s  
structure was similar to that of a paired-share REIT such as Starwood. However, within one year if 
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formation of MeriStar, Starwood had to give up its paired-share status and became a C-Corporation with 
a wholly owned REIT subsidiary and eventually spun off its REIT. In addition, Starwood changed it 
business strategy to managing hotels and moved away from the hotel ownership. Thus MeriStar 
Hospitality is compared with traditional REITs for the later periods (Table B.1 and Figure B.7). 
 
With 117 owned hotels in its portfolio, MeriStar Hospitality became the fourth largest hotel REIT with a 
strong presence in the luxury and upscale segments of the U.S. lodging industry.  However, MeriStar 
Hospitality was highly levered.  Both, CapStar and American General had pursued aggressive acquisition 
strategies since their initial public offerings. Thus, their merger created a company with more debt that 
its peers (Table B.1).  Later on this high debt became one of the main causes of  MeriStar’s  poor  
performance. For instance, one of the loan agreements prohibited MeriStar from using asset sale 
proceeds to pay down a $154 million convertible note that was due in October 2004. The weak demand 
after the 9/11 attacks, its heavy reliance on corporate and business travelers, and concentration of its 
hotels in the second tier markets that underperformed larger urban cities, further put downward 
pressure  on  MeriStar’s  stock  (Salomon Smith Barney Equity Research, 2003). 
 
 
Table B.1: MeriStar vs. Competition 
 
 
Company
Debt Ratio                    
(Total Assets/ 
Total Liabilities)
Debt Equity Ratio       
(Total Liabilities/ 
Shareholders Equity
FFO Multiples            
(Price/FFO)*
Starwood Hotels & Resorts 0.73 2.67 4.07 x
Patriot American Hospitality 0.65 1.85 4.91 x
FelCor Lodging Trust 0.44 0.80 7.18 x
RFS Hotel Investors 0.40 0.66 4.83 x
Equity Inns 0.47 0.87 5.71 x
Innkeepers USA Trust 0.37 0.60 5.18 x
Average 0.51 1.24 5.31 x
MeriStar Hospitality 0.57 1.33 4.30 x
Source: 10-K Reports and CRSP Database as of 12/31/1998
* P/FFO is Market Capitalization divided by Funds from Operations 
Paired-share REITs
Traditional REITs
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Figure B.7: Stock Performance of MeriStar Hospitality 
 
 
 
 
B.6: Conclusion 
 
When  MeriStar  was  formed  in  1998,  many  analysts  lauded  its  innovative  ‘paper-clip’  structure.  The 
then imminent REIT Reform Act of 1998, which was designed to take away the tax benefits of a paired-
share status, fueled this excitement further. However, the paper-clip structure never really took off. The 
lack of examples with this arrangement coupled with a poor financial performance of MeriStar; makes it 
difficult to justify the benefits of a paper-clip structure.  
 
One of the primary drawbacks of this structure is the divergent shareholders of the two paper-clipped 
companies.  In  MeriStar’s  case,  the  merger  transaction  was  so  structured  that  CapStar’s  shareholders  
became  the  primary  shareholders  of  MeriStar  Resorts  (the  C  Corp)  while  both;  American  General’s  and  
CapStar’s  shareholders  became  the  shareholders  of  MeriStar  Hospitality  (the  REIT).    Thus  from  its  
inception, MeriStar Resort’s  shareholder  base  was  different  than  that  of  MeriStar  Hospitality’s.     
 
Table  B.2  shows  the  divergent  representation  for  both  companies’  top  10  shareholders.  Less  than  half  of  
the institutional investors in MeriStar Hospitality, the REIT owner, also had an investment in MeriStar 
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Resorts, the C Corp operator (Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Analyst Report, 1999). Since the board of 
each company had a fiduciary duty to its shareholder; the paper-clip structure might have created 
possible conflicts of interests between the management and shareholders.  
 
 
Table B.2: Top 10 Shareholders of MeriStar Hospitality and MeriStar Resorts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top-Ten Shareholders of MeriStar Hospitality, the REIT hotel owner 
(Value of shareholdings at December 9, 1999) 
 
Institution        Total Investment (000s) 
1. Alliance Capital Management L.P.     $80,838 
2. Franklin Resources, Inc.      $72,582 
3. LaSalle Investment Management     $50,608 
4. RREEF Real Estate Securities Adv.     $44,282 
5. First Capital Alliance       $33,786 
6. Capital Guardian Trust       $30,668 
7. Ohio Public Emp. Retirement System     $27,036 
8. Barclay’s  Global  Investors,  N.A.       $22,864 
9. MFS Investment Management      $16,517 
10. Smith Barney/Citigroup      $13,838 
 
Top-Ten Shareholders of MeriStar Hotels and Resorts, the C Corp hotel operator 
(Value of shareholdings at December 9, 1999) 
 
Institution        Total  Investment  (000’s) 
1. First Capital Alliance       $19,083 
2. Franklin Resources, Inc.      $5,755 
3. LaSalle Investment Management     $2,338 
4. MFS Investment Management      $2,335 
5. RREEF Real Estate Securities Adv.     $1,654 
6. Smith Barney Asset Management     $1,003 
7. The Vanguard Group       $839 
8. Fidelity Management and Research Co.     $775 
9. Barclays Global Investors, N.A.      $695 
10. TIAA-CREF Investment Management Inc.    $35 
 
Source: Technimetrics and Morgan Stanley Dan Witter (1999) 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents a summary of research findings and then proceeds to conclusion 
section. The chapter identifies research limitations and closes the recommendations for 
future research. 
 
 
 
 
6.1: Research Findings  
 
One of the primary features that separate hotel REITs from hotel C-Corporations is the degree of 
flexibility to combine the ownership and management of hotels. The REIT being designed as a passive 
investment vehicle cannot own and operate hotels because income generated from the operation of 
hotels does not qualify as suitable income under REIT qualification requirements. In addition, hotels are 
considerably more operationally intensive as compared with other types of commercial real estate with 
significantly longer lease terms. However, the rental income derived from leasing of hotels is a qualified 
income under the REIT regulations, meaning that hotel REITs can own properties and receive rental 
income from a lessee. 
 
Several hotel REITs that went public in the 1990s were structured with a third-party lessee, which would 
either actively manage the hotel properties, or hire an outside management company to run the day-to-
day operations of the hotels. Two problems arose with this traditional structure of hotel REITs:  
 
(a) Conflict of Interest - Several traditional REITs contracted with private management firms, 
which were owned by the executive officers of the REITs to lease and operate the hotels, 
thus creating a conflict of interest. This conflict of interest was resolved for many companies 
through the sale by the affiliates of their hotel management companies which in most cases 
were also the lessees11 
 
                                                             
11 Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. Real Estate Investment Trusts: Coverage Initiation, dated October 25, 2006. Retrieved 
from http://libproxy.mit.edu/login/thomsonone 
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(b) Leakage - traditional REITs did not enjoy the full benefit of cash-flow improvement from the 
hotel properties they owned due to the leakage to third party management companies.  
 
The “paired-share” REITs averted these problems because they paired a share of the REIT with a share of 
an operating C-Corporation and traded as one security. Thus, paired-share REITs such as Starwood and 
Patriot American were able to eliminate the conflict of interest and leakage issue but enjoy tax benefits 
of a REIT status. Ultimately the structure worked too well. After Starwood was able to outbid the much 
larger Hilton Hotels for ITT Sheraton Corporation, the benefits of the grandfathered paired-share 
structure were eliminated with the passage of the REIT Reform Act of 1998. Consequently, Starwood 
combined its operating company and REIT into one integrated C-corporation. 
 
Thus, REIT Reform Act of 1998 was considered unfavorable for the hotel REITs. However, the event 
study indicated that the stock market viewed the enactment of this act as a positive sign for hotel REITs 
as a whole. One possible reason could be that by taking away privileges of a select few, this Act made 
hospitality industry less monopolistic and more competitive.  One surprising finding was the negative 
market reaction to C-Corporations. Overbuilding has been cited as the primary cause of this negative 
outlook. However, any over-supply should have affected hotel REITs in the same way as their C-
Corporation counterparts. 
 
At time when the REIT Reform Act of 1998 eliminated the grandfathered paired-share status, MeriStar 
Hospitality was created by a merger between a REIT and a C-Corporation. MeriStar was unique because 
it tried to replicate the paired-share structure  and  formed  a  “paper-clip” REIT. This structure mainly 
referred to inter-company agreements through which the REIT leased its hotels almost exclusively to the 
hotel management C-Corporation company. In addition, there was a significant overlap between the 
senior management team and Boards of Directors at the two entities; however the two companies 
traded separately. Thus, an investor was able to recreate  the  ‘paired-share’  structure  because  he/she  
could  own  both  stocks  to  capture  the  leakage  and  at  the  same  time  benefit  from  REIT’s  tax  exempt  
status.  
 
However, the paper-clip structure never really took off. One of the primary drawbacks of this structure 
was the divergent shareholders of the two paper-clipped companies. Since the board of each company 
had a fiduciary duty to its shareholder; the paper-clip structure might have created possible conflicts of 
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interests between the shared management and divergent shareholders. The lack of examples with this 
arrangement coupled with a poor financial performance of MeriStar; makes it difficult to justify the 
benefits of a paper-clip structure.  
 
Though the paper-clip structure resolved the leakage issue to a certain extent, it was finally eliminated 
by the enactment of the REIT Modernization Act (RMA) of 1999.  The RMA allowed REITS to own up to 
100% of the stock of a Taxable REIT Subsidiary (TRS) which, in the case of hotel REITs, were permitted to 
own the lessee of the hotels, thus eliminating the need for third party lessees. Most hotel REITs now 
lease their hotels to their taxable REIT subsidiaries, which in turn engage a third party management 
company to operate the hotels for a fee. As a result, the  REIT  retains  any  “leakage”  due  to  its  ownership  
of the lessee. 
 
The RMA offered greater flexibilities to REITs and in addition, the income distribution requirement was 
reduced from 95% to 90%. Thus, the RMA was hypothesized to be beneficial to hotel REITs. However, 
the event study results indicated greater negative cumulative average abnormal returns accumulated to 
REITs for the entire event window of (-30, +30) days. The negative returns were observed in the period 
prior to the passage of the RMA and may have caused due to the uncertainty over the passage of the 
bill.  REITs did accrue positive returns for a period around and after the passage of the bill.   
 
Graff (2001) noted that the 1960 legislation that created REITs was not passed as a stand-alone bill but 
as a rider to the Cigar Excise Tax Extension bill.  Therefore, REIT industry owes its existence more to the 
lobbyists than to recognition by Congress of the desirability of providing real estate investors with an 
access to the public markets.  In addition, Graff observed that the REIT industry has strongly lobbied 
over several decades to achieve a step-by-step reduction in constraints imposed by the original 
legislation.  In  line  with  Graff’s  observations,  the results of the event studies conducted in this research 
are significantly different than zero and thereby, underscore the importance of legislative changes on 
lodging stocks.  
 
REITs fuel their growth mainly through acquisitions, and therefore a study of REIT structure in M&A 
settings was important to determine whether a REIT status really has advantages in mergers and 
acquisitions in the lodging industry.  The findings of the event study suggest that over a short term, the 
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hotel REIT acquirers increase shareholder wealth. In addition, both REIT bidders and their targets 
performed better than C-Corporation bidders and their targets.  
 
This study confirmed the findings of previous studies that REITs typically pay higher acquisition 
premiums than their non-REIT counterparts. The intriguing finding, however, was that that stock market 
did not punish REIT acquirers for their overpayments. As discussed in the literature review, possible 
reasons for positive public market reactions could be (a) REITs face regulatory time constraints to deploy 
capital quickly; (b) the higher present value of future management fees, provide incentives to REIT 
manager to investment in real estate with less concern for acquisition costs; (c) tax benefits of the REIT 
status.  
 
Finally, a comparative analysis of the monthly total returns of hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporations for a 
period from August 1993 through December 2011 did not provide conclusive results. On a market 
capitalization basis, the performance of hotel REITs was almost identical to that of hotel C-Corporations. 
However, when weighted equally, hotel REITs did outperform hotel C-Corporations by a substantial 
margin but  hotel  REITs’  returns  were  highly  volatile.  This  suggests that over the sample period, small 
hotel REITs performed better than their larger counterparts, and the performance of large hotel C-
Corporations was superior to their smaller counterparts.  
 
 
 
6.2: Conclusion 
 
On a broad level, the hospitality business has two distinct segments – ownership of hotels and 
management of hotels. Hotel REITs are exempt from the corporate tax but face regulatory constraints 
on management of hotels.  On the other hand, hotel C-Corporations do not enjoy the tax benefits but 
have total flexibility to combine the ownership and management of their assets. Therefore, the choice of 
structure  depends  greatly  on  a  firm’s  business  strategy.   
 
As a passive investment vehicle, the REIT structure is obviously suited for ownership of hotels. In 
addition, this study suggests that REITs acquirers have an advantage in mergers and acquisitions. 
However, when it comes to hotel management, the net benefits of REITs are not as clear. On market cap 
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basis, the performance of hotel REITs and hotel C-Corporations was almost identical, however when 
equally weighted, hotel REITs outperformed their C-Corporation counterparts.  In addition, the returns 
of REITs were highly volatile. Consequently, the findings of this research tend to favor small and/or mid-
cap hotel REITs and large hotel C-Corporations.  
 
To quote Professor Myers,  “if one were to follow the Darwinian principle, only the strongest 
organizational structure should survive”.  However,  the  hospitality  industry  doesn’t  have  a  clear  winner  - 
since their inception almost 20 years ago, hotel REITs still survive.  The continued existence of hotel 
REITs could possibly be explained by the constantly evolving REIT legislation.  
 
 
 
6.3: Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
 
This study is not without limitations. One of the chief shortcomings of this research effort was the small 
sample size of event study related to M&As. Future research on this topic could eliminate this issue by 
looking at acquisitions of individual properties or assets as opposed to acquisitions entire companies. 
Second, the M&A event study examined the short-term effect of these events. Given the illiquidity of 
real estate assets and higher transaction costs, it would be useful to compare the post-merger long-term 
performance of REITs and C-Corporations.  
 
Third, in this research we observed the public market reaction around a period when the bill was signed. 
However, the enactment of legislative amendments is a lengthy process, thereby affecting the stock 
price long before the signing of the bill.  Thus, a future study could track the effect of entire legislative 
process.  
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APPENDIX 1: THE REIT REFORM ACT OF 1998 EVENT STUDY RESULTS  
 
 
Market Adjusted Returns, Value Weighted Index  
Chapter 2, Hypothesis 1 
 
C-Corporations  
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
-30 0.70% 7:06 0.221 0.146 0.727 0.513 
-29 -0.57% 7:06 -0.996 -1.455$ -0.592 -0.33 
-28 0.61% 7:06 0.379 0.498 0.634 0.56 
-27 -1.48% 4:09 -1.911* -1.590$ -1.526$ -1.074 
-26 0.39% 7:06 0.791 0.852 0.397 0.813 
-25 -0.35% 8:05 -0.441 -0.708 -0.36 0.063 
-24 -0.98% 4:09 -1.416$ -1.410$ -1.009 -0.731 
-23 -0.10% 7:06 -0.318 -0.343 -0.101 0.386 
-22 -0.11% 6:07 0.336 0.387 -0.11 0.252 
-21 0.18% 8:05 -0.029 -0.026 0.191 0.515 
-20 -0.40% 5:08 -0.193 -0.23 -0.414 -0.266 
-19 -0.64% 5:08 -1.261 -1.104 -0.66 -0.942 
-18 0.44% 9:4> 0.631 1.066 0.457 1.067 
-17 0.12% 7:06 0.754 0.635 0.123 0.699 
-16 0.47% 7:06 0.074 0.103 0.481 0.304 
-15 -2.20% 3:10< -3.729*** -2.303* -2.273* -1.733* 
-14 -0.28% 5:08 0.021 0.022 -0.289 -0.191 
-13 -0.27% 5:08 -0.496 -0.833 -0.274 -0.278 
-12 -0.27% 4:09 -0.569 -0.606 -0.277 -0.477 
-11 -0.48% 6:07 -0.487 -0.606 -0.494 -0.134 
-10 0.00% 6:07 -0.182 -0.148 -0.002 -0.335 
-9 0.90% 8:05 0.916 1.19 0.926 1.109 
-8 -0.54% 6:07 -0.577 -0.821 -0.56 -0.223 
-7 1.78% 11:2>> 2.916** 2.067* 1.833* 2.039* 
-6 -0.71% 5:08 -1.196 -1.817* -0.731 -0.892 
-5 -1.55% 5:08 -1.790* -1.437$ -1.597$ -0.91 
-4 0.12% 4:09 0.08 0.076 0.119 -0.144 
-3 -0.06% 3:10< -0.447 -0.645 -0.066 -0.281 
-2 0.11% 7:06 -0.121 -0.157 0.111 0.274 
-1 0.37% 8:05 0.749 0.744 0.379 1.092 
0 0.15% 7:06 -0.029 -0.045 0.15 0.371 
1 -0.40% 8:05 -0.54 -0.37 -0.417 0.624 
2 -0.30% 6:07 -0.594 -0.812 -0.314 -0.241 
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C-Corporations  
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
3 -1.48% 2:11< -1.836* -2.772** -1.523$ -1.541$ 
4 0.29% 5:08 0.25 0.374 0.302 0.296 
5 -1.94% 6:07 -2.155* -1.345$ -1.998* -0.566 
6 -1.26% 3:10< -1.912* -1.142 -1.298$ -1.554$ 
7 -0.91% 6:07 -1.287$ -0.926 -0.939 -0.315 
8 -1.14% 5:08 -2.788** -1.569$ -1.179 -0.999 
9 0.30% 8:05 0.561 0.369 0.307 1.092 
10 -4.32% 4:09 -5.487*** -1.813* -4.457*** -1.181 
11 1.83% 7:06 2.120* 0.911 1.891* 0.704 
12 1.19% 8:05 1.818* 1.400$ 1.23 1.174 
13 0.74% 7:06 0.497 0.341 0.766 0.801 
14 -1.47% 4:09 -1.840* -2.362** -1.513$ -1.245 
15 -1.12% 4:09 -1.585$ -1.114 -1.151 -0.753 
16 0.19% 7:06 0.375 0.279 0.192 0.408 
17 0.26% 7:06 0.604 0.395 0.27 0.503 
18 -0.95% 3:10< -1.392$ -1.500$ -0.979 -1.404$ 
19 -1.32% 5:08 -1.403$ -1.678* -1.359$ -1.017 
20 1.33% 8:05 2.410** 0.958 1.375$ 0.721 
21 0.64% 6:07 0.353 0.382 0.663 0.463 
22 -0.87% 4:09 -1.168 -1.029 -0.895 -0.484 
23 -0.11% 3:10< -0.196 -0.17 -0.116 -0.487 
24 -0.29% 6:07 -0.286 -0.329 -0.3 -0.054 
25 -0.31% 6:07 -0.367 -0.459 -0.315 -0.084 
26 -3.18% 5:08 -3.591*** -1.452$ -3.283*** -1.049 
27 -0.47% 5:08 -1.079 -0.764 -0.48 -0.581 
28 1.34% 9:4> 1.986* 1.397$ 1.385$ 1.457$ 
29 -4.98% 1:12<< -6.993*** -6.870*** -5.142*** -4.144*** 
30 0.49% 6:07 -0.231 -0.112 0.502 0.092 
              
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels 
of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, <, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -
- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less than in the parameter estimation 
period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation period. 
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REITs 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
-30 -0.80% 1:10<< -1.566$ -3.085** -0.839 -0.989 
-29 0.40% 6:05 0.611 0.756 0.418 0.433 
-28 0.26% 7:04 0.491 0.631 0.271 0.528 
-27 -0.60% 3:8( -1.227 -1.817* -0.627 -0.661 
-26 1.03% 9:2> 2.154* 3.224*** 1.078 1.589$ 
-25 -0.83% 3:8( -1.944* -2.234* -0.865 -1.061 
-24 -1.11% 3:8( -2.052* -2.825** -1.162 -1.300$ 
-23 0.19% 6:05 0.488 0.516 0.198 0.407 
-22 -0.10% 4:07 -0.335 -0.428 -0.1 -0.156 
-21 -0.41% 5:06 -0.641 -0.774 -0.426 -0.265 
-20 -1.27% 1:10<< -2.502** -3.426*** -1.334$ -1.435$ 
-19 -0.84% 2:9< -1.684* -1.387$ -0.882 -1.336$ 
-18 1.20% 9:2> 2.142* 2.735** 1.258 1.399$ 
-17 -0.59% 2:9< -0.759 -0.539 -0.614 -0.691 
-16 -0.34% 5:06 -0.487 -0.328 -0.357 0.069 
-15 2.97% 10:1>> 5.622*** 2.751** 3.114*** 1.945* 
-14 -1.31% 4:07 -2.405** -1.666* -1.376$ -0.823 
-13 0.13% 7:04 0.435 0.628 0.132 0.307 
-12 -0.66% 3:8( -1.253 -1.643$ -0.693 -0.774 
-11 1.07% 9:2> 2.114* 2.520** 1.12 1.355$ 
-10 -1.06% 3:8( -1.381$ -1.519$ -1.113 -0.716 
-9 0.71% 6:05 0.533 0.462 0.746 0.285 
-8 -0.71% 4:07 -1.354$ -1.576$ -0.74 -0.875 
-7 -0.08% 3:8( -0.133 -0.261 -0.081 0.103 
-6 -0.92% 0:11<<< -1.925* -4.089*** -0.967 -1.239 
-5 0.05% 6:05 -0.187 -0.301 0.052 0.071 
-4 -0.60% 5:06 -0.659 -1.062 -0.629 -0.267 
-3 -0.08% 4:07 -0.016 -0.017 -0.08 -0.236 
-2 0.07% 5:06 -0.09 -0.105 0.074 -0.091 
-1 1.15% 9:2> 2.230* 1.581$ 1.203 1.165 
0 -0.32% 5:06 -0.57 -0.816 -0.331 -0.206 
1 0.26% 4:07 0.422 0.391 0.268 0.237 
2 -0.38% 4:07 -0.927 -0.895 -0.398 -0.522 
3 -1.89% 1:10<< -3.637*** -2.557** -1.976* -1.460$ 
4 1.53% 8:3> 2.648** 2.430** 1.604$ 1.468$ 
5 -0.01% 7:04 -0.037 -0.047 -0.012 0.293 
6 -2.42% 2:9< -4.757*** -2.729** -2.535** -1.767* 
7 0.24% 7:04 0.253 0.2 0.25 0.346 
8 -0.63% 4:07 -1.432$ -0.733 -0.659 -0.147 
9 1.06% 7:04 2.015* 1.045 1.114 0.952 
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REITs 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
10 0.56% 4:07 0.888 0.303 0.59 -0.267 
11 -0.29% 7:04 -0.639 -0.207 -0.302 0.247 
12 0.93% 6:05 2.108* 1.215 0.97 0.502 
13 1.10% 9:2> 1.981* 1.646* 1.153 1.189 
14 0.73% 7:04 1.628$ 2.169* 0.762 1.161 
15 -1.05% 2:9< -2.056* -1.567$ -1.1 -1.247 
16 0.36% 7:04 0.602 0.538 0.375 0.611 
17 -0.51% 4:07 -0.884 -0.713 -0.538 -0.263 
18 -2.59% 1:10<< -5.587*** -2.938** -2.711** -1.969* 
19 -0.70% 4:07 -0.584 -0.299 -0.728 -0.534 
20 0.31% 6:05 0.613 0.674 0.321 0.348 
21 1.37% 9:2> 2.532** 3.362*** 1.439$ 1.719* 
22 -0.02% 6:05 0.043 0.061 -0.022 0.018 
23 -0.44% 4:07 -0.792 -0.733 -0.462 -0.263 
24 -1.38% 3:8( -2.624** -1.968* -1.445$ -1.061 
25 1.07% 7:04 1.738* 1.238 1.122 0.847 
26 0.38% 7:04 0.231 0.155 0.394 0.51 
27 1.14% 9:2> 2.240* 1.913* 1.192 1.333$ 
28 -0.19% 4:07 -0.592 -0.262 -0.203 -0.665 
29 -1.31% 4:07 -2.325* -0.862 -1.367$ -0.708 
30 0.76% 8:3> 1.470$ 1.222 0.797 1.066 
              
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels 
of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, <, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -
- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less than in the parameter estimation 
period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation period. 
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C-Corporations  
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
-30 -0.63% 0.129861 -1.156 -0.565 -0.42 -0.628 
-29 0.30% 4:06 0.571 0.563 0.2 0.522 
-28 1.19% 0.252778 0.846 0.673 0.786 0.698 
-27 0.22% 5:05 0.324 0.443 0.146 0.262 
-26 -0.20% 0.211806 0.157 0.148 -0.13 0.05 
-25 -1.06% 2:8< -1.007 -1.811* -0.705 -1.058 
-24 -1.39% 0.170833 -0.662 -0.518 -0.918 0.201 
-23 1.85% 5:05 1.598$ 1.091 1.227 0.592 
-22 -3.20% 0:10<< -2.798** -4.389*** -2.118* -2.650** 
-21 3.43% 9:1>> 2.451** 1.867* 2.274* 1.896* 
-20 -0.88% 0.129861 -0.611 -1.673* -0.584 -0.603 
-19 1.36% 8:2> 1.211 2.154* 0.904 1.427$ 
-18 0.05% 0.211806 -0.085 -0.134 0.033 -0.179 
-17 -0.34% 7:3) -0.132 -0.134 -0.226 0.416 
-16 -0.81% 0.129861 -0.819 -1.439$ -0.535 -0.667 
-15 0.84% 5:05 0.645 1.268 0.555 0.913 
-14 0.69% 0.211806 0.303 0.296 0.459 0.578 
-13 1.80% 10:0>>> 1.571$ 3.145*** 1.191 1.943* 
-12 -2.63% 1:9<< -2.022* -3.074** -1.740* -1.918* 
-11 0.05% 0.170833 -0.095 -0.114 0.035 -0.324 
-10 -0.64% 0.170833 -0.529 -0.932 -0.423 -0.62 
-9 -1.03% 0.170833 -0.476 -0.63 -0.681 -0.327 
-8 -0.91% 0.211806 -0.774 -0.858 -0.606 -0.838 
-7 0.28% 8:2> 0.243 0.72 0.183 0.477 
-6 -1.31% 2:8< -1.011 -1.015 -0.865 -1.033 
-5 -0.40% 0.129861 -0.295 -0.456 -0.266 -0.464 
-4 -0.64% 1:9<< -0.696 -1.284$ -0.426 -0.681 
-3 0.80% 7:3) 0.648 1.064 0.528 0.891 
-2 -2.88% 0.129861 -1.874* -1.419$ -1.905* -0.972 
-1 -1.04% 3:07 -0.428 -0.325 -0.69 -0.38 
0 2.13% 0.170833 1.433$ 0.916 1.414$ 0.69 
1 0.36% 7:3) 0.59 0.604 0.236 0.673 
2 -0.76% 3:07 -1.06 -0.775 -0.503 -0.667 
3 -0.56% 1:9<< -0.443 -0.585 -0.368 -0.438 
4 0.16% 0.170833 0.098 0.113 0.103 -0.318 
5 0.21% 7:3) 0.121 0.243 0.139 0.355 
6 0.19% 0.211806 0.201 0.27 0.128 0.151 
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C-Corporations  
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
7 -2.25% 0.129861 -1.802* -1.656* -1.491$ -1.153 
8 1.55% 4:06 0.787 0.788 1.025 0.659 
9 0.73% 6:04 0.815 1.255 0.484 0.81 
10 -0.39% 5:05 -0.254 -0.225 -0.257 0.114 
11 0.89% 7:3) 0.995 1.113 0.59 1.231 
12 0.39% 5:05 0.373 0.551 0.261 0.38 
13 3.78% 10:0>>> 2.947** 3.775*** 2.506** 2.722** 
14 -4.61% 0:10<< -3.816*** -5.613*** -3.052** -3.264*** 
15 -2.05% 2:8< -1.867* -2.455** -1.356$ -1.779* 
16 0.90% 0.252778 0.776 1.25 0.599 0.991 
17 0.20% 5:05 -0.027 -0.055 0.134 0.142 
18 -2.85% 1:9<< -2.161* -2.881** -1.886* -2.019* 
19 -0.57% 3:07 -0.376 -0.969 -0.378 -0.48 
20 0.84% 7:3) 0.637 0.642 0.555 0.715 
21 0.78% 0.211806 0.484 1.211 0.518 0.746 
22 -0.67% 5:05 -0.676 -1.285$ -0.445 -0.491 
23 -1.56% 2:8< -1.425$ -1.731* -1.033 -1.184 
24 1.36% 0.211806 1.396$ 1.026 0.899 0.706 
25 -0.04% 4:06 0.013 0.017 -0.028 0.078 
26 0.15% 0.211806 -0.27 -0.163 0.098 -0.081 
27 -0.29% 6:04 0.034 0.055 -0.189 0.235 
28 2.27% 7:3) 1.975* 1.092 1.503$ 1.109 
29 -0.41% 0.170833 -0.637 -0.681 -0.272 -0.614 
30 -2.67% 0.129861 -2.144* -1.911* -1.765* -1.438$ 
              
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels 
of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, <, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -
- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less than in the parameter estimation 
period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation period. 
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REITs 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test Z 
-30 -1.76% 4:10( -2.799** -2.094* -1.477$ -1.07 
-29 -1.35% 5:09 -2.115* -2.375** -1.139 -0.877 
-28 -1.14% 4:10( -1.759* -1.611$ -0.957 -0.606 
-27 0.49% 5:09 0.756 1.163 0.413 0.497 
-26 -1.22% 2:12<< -1.998* -4.062*** -1.03 -1.159 
-25 -1.20% 5:09 -2.035* -2.656** -1.012 -0.877 
-24 -2.31% 3:11< -3.086** -2.392** -1.946* -1.178 
-23 -0.20% 5:09 -0.152 -0.221 -0.168 -0.096 
-22 -1.91% 2:12<< -3.032** -3.778*** -1.605$ -1.629$ 
-21 0.53% 9:5) 0.548 0.572 0.445 0.527 
-20 -1.71% 1:13<< -2.394** -3.169*** -1.442$ -1.233 
-19 1.05% 10:4> 1.759* 1.734* 0.88 0.921 
-18 -1.06% 4:10( -1.727* -1.836* -0.895 -0.825 
-17 0.70% 10:4> 1.226 1.631$ 0.585 0.912 
-16 -0.52% 3:11< -1.044 -1.355$ -0.435 -0.658 
-15 0.14% 7:07 0.182 0.288 0.122 0.282 
-14 0.55% 9:5) 0.861 1.365$ 0.46 0.709 
-13 2.54% 13:1>>> 3.892*** 4.344*** 2.136* 2.067* 
-12 -1.75% 1:13<< -2.716** -3.429*** -1.475$ -1.321$ 
-11 -1.27% 1:13<< -2.104* -4.083*** -1.065 -1.235 
-10 -1.82% 3:11< -3.011** -3.491*** -1.529$ -1.473$ 
-9 0.47% 10:4> 0.766 1.560$ 0.393 0.721 
-8 0.43% 9:5) 0.643 1.444$ 0.359 0.65 
-7 -2.46% 3:11< -3.475*** -3.240*** -2.066* -1.439$ 
-6 -1.36% 4:10( -2.191* -2.155* -1.144 -0.782 
-5 -1.85% 3:11< -2.645** -2.087* -1.553$ -1.189 
-4 -0.26% 4:10( -0.551 -0.627 -0.22 -0.172 
-3 2.11% 13:1>>> 3.042** 4.526*** 1.774* 1.812* 
-2 -1.06% 2:12<< -1.963* -2.477** -0.894 -1.174 
-1 0.00% 7:07 -0.185 -0.218 -0.002 0.002 
0 0.74% 11:3>> 1.444$ 2.032* 0.627 1.139 
1 0.88% 10:4> 1.432$ 1.629$ 0.744 0.817 
2 -0.51% 5:09 -0.915 -0.762 -0.427 -0.498 
3 0.22% 8:06 0.229 0.216 0.189 0.512 
4 -1.49% 3:11< -2.372** -3.937*** -1.253 -1.315$ 
5 0.57% 10:4> 0.789 1.071 0.478 0.693 
6 -0.95% 3:11< -1.236 -1.559$ -0.798 -0.431 
7 -0.32% 4:10( -0.514 -0.952 -0.268 -0.258 
8 0.24% 5:09 0.58 0.616 0.202 0.336 
9 0.26% 6:08 -0.148 -0.133 0.221 -0.179 
10 1.03% 7:07 1.906* 1.582$ 0.87 0.779 
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REITs 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test Z 
11 4.17% 14:0>>> 6.672*** 10.199*** 3.505*** 2.907** 
12 -0.77% 5:09 -1.124 -1.602$ -0.646 -0.496 
13 1.94% 12:2>> 3.264*** 3.783*** 1.629$ 1.740* 
14 -1.02% 6:08 -1.662* -1.937* -0.858 -0.744 
15 -0.11% 7:07 -0.186 -0.2 -0.091 -0.065 
16 2.15% 12:2>> 3.601*** 2.936** 1.812* 1.830* 
17 0.19% 8:06 0.475 0.618 0.164 0.441 
18 -1.23% 3:11< -2.403** -2.704** -1.034 -1.341$ 
19 -1.30% 5:09 -2.049* -2.075* -1.095 -0.759 
20 0.12% 9:5) 0.184 0.245 0.102 0.275 
21 -1.06% 3:11< -1.399$ -1.391$ -0.893 -0.785 
22 -0.44% 6:08 -0.653 -1.182 -0.373 -0.284 
23 -0.28% 5:09 -0.472 -0.76 -0.238 -0.132 
24 2.41% 12:2>> 3.538*** 2.933** 2.032* 1.624$ 
25 -1.33% 6:08 -1.835* -1.874* -1.122 -0.673 
26 1.66% 11:3>> 2.386** 3.160*** 1.398$ 1.421$ 
27 0.41% 8:06 0.778 0.794 0.348 0.347 
28 2.78% 14:0>>> 4.433*** 6.698*** 2.339** 2.371** 
29 -4.26% 2:12<< -6.475*** -1.580$ -3.583*** -1.543$ 
30 -2.15% 3:11< -3.286*** -2.086* -1.812* -1.097 
              
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels of 
.10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, <, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -- (, 
< -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less than in the parameter estimation 
period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation period. 
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Market Adjusted Returns, Value Weighted Index  
Chapter 3, Hypothesis 1 
 
C-Corporations  
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
-30 -0.53% 0.127 -0.581 -1.644$ -0.508 -0.712 
-29 -0.38% 0.086 -0.512 -1.094 -0.367 -0.374 
-28 -1.19% 1:5( -1.475$ -0.924 -1.133 -1.216 
-27 -0.10% 0.127 -0.115 -0.106 -0.096 0.204 
-26 0.33% 0.168 -0.037 -0.036 0.314 0.306 
-25 -0.11% 0.127 0.144 0.189 -0.108 0.028 
-24 0.25% 0.168 0.253 0.389 0.242 0.708 
-23 -0.37% 0.127 -0.397 -0.546 -0.351 -0.22 
-22 -1.21% 1:5( -1.491$ -1.799* -1.158 -1.246 
-21 0.26% 0.168 0.048 0.053 0.252 0.575 
-20 -0.41% 0.086 -0.166 -0.247 -0.395 -0.134 
-19 -0.52% 0.086 -0.583 -1.241 -0.492 -0.716 
-18 -0.74% 0.086 -0.849 -1.047 -0.71 -0.643 
-17 -0.15% 0.086 0.265 0.121 -0.143 -1.246 
-16 0.52% 0.127 0.631 1.06 0.497 0.742 
-15 0.13% 0.127 0.343 0.307 0.126 0.289 
-14 0.10% 0.127 0.361 0.497 0.098 0.451 
-13 -0.71% 1:5( -0.593 -0.931 -0.681 -0.459 
-12 2.09% 5:1> 1.874* 2.009* 1.994* 1.931* 
-11 -1.14% 0.086 -0.95 -1.352$ -1.085 -1.152 
-10 -0.32% 0.086 -0.352 -0.82 -0.305 -0.344 
-9 -1.02% 0.086 -0.997 -1.724* -0.971 -1.118 
-8 -0.68% 1:5( -0.603 -1.531$ -0.652 -0.724 
-7 1.55% 6:0>> 1.842* 2.143* 1.475$ 1.982* 
-6 0.08% 0.086 0.156 0.239 0.078 0.191 
-5 0.40% 0.168 0.207 0.217 0.383 0.507 
-4 -0.01% 0.127 -0.085 -0.126 -0.008 -0.134 
-3 0.13% 0.168 0.269 0.218 0.128 0.652 
-2 -1.46% 0.086 -1.472$ -1.529$ -1.395$ -1.118 
-1 0.29% 0.086 0.523 0.438 0.276 -0.126 
0 -4.27% 1:5( -4.059*** -2.253* -4.076*** -2.229* 
1 -0.40% 0.127 -0.653 -0.255 -0.379 -0.224 
2 2.19% 5:1> 2.037* 2.122* 2.093* 1.918* 
3 -0.22% 0.127 -0.155 -0.147 -0.214 -0.327 
4 -1.29% 1:5( -1.339$ -3.323*** -1.23 -1.712* 
5 0.07% 5:1> 0.005 0.007 0.068 0.451 
6 0.58% 0.168 0.639 0.765 0.553 0.704 
7 -0.16% 0.086 -0.138 -0.209 -0.156 -0.271 
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C-Corporations  
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
8 1.13% 0.127 1.365$ 0.971 1.076 0.747 
9 0.19% 0.127 0.241 0.522 0.179 0.323 
10 -0.20% 0.127 -0.059 -0.094 -0.188 -0.066 
11 -0.67% 0.086 -0.562 -0.465 -0.636 -0.588 
12 -0.01% 0.127 -0.034 -0.073 -0.011 0.135 
13 0.23% 0.127 0.054 0.068 0.222 0.413 
14 -1.08% 1:5( -1.265 -1.854* -1.035 -1.319$ 
15 -0.21% 0.168 -0.439 -0.465 -0.198 -0.053 
16 0.83% 0.168 0.69 1.014 0.795 0.969 
17 0.75% 5:1> 0.765 0.864 0.712 1.161 
18 0.22% 0.086 0.082 0.153 0.209 0.268 
19 -0.12% 0.127 -0.219 -0.345 -0.114 -0.087 
20 -0.40% 0.086 -0.391 -0.63 -0.378 -0.429 
21 -0.98% 0.086 -1.074 -2.065* -0.939 -1.25 
22 -0.72% 1:5( -0.718 -1.743* -0.686 -0.947 
23 0.49% 0.168 0.452 0.971 0.464 0.815 
24 -0.23% 0.127 -0.245 -0.431 -0.216 -0.203 
25 -0.39% 0.127 -0.556 -0.63 -0.373 -0.369 
26 -0.31% 0.086 -0.528 -1.018 -0.299 -0.498 
27 -0.05% 0.127 -0.009 -0.026 -0.052 0.101 
28 -0.10% 0.168 0.089 0.168 -0.093 0.34 
29 -0.89% 0.086 -0.999 -0.931 -0.852 -0.716 
30 -1.01% 0.086 -0.909 -1.122 -0.96 -1.011 
              
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels 
of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, <, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -
- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less than in the parameter estimation 
period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation period. 
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REITs 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
-30 0.75% 6:1> 1.447$ 1.009 0.975 1.503$ 
-29 0.45% 0.210 0.774 0.868 0.582 0.965 
-28 0.05% 0.128 -0.041 -0.034 0.066 -0.315 
-27 -0.25% 0.128 -0.329 -0.337 -0.317 0.019 
-26 -0.52% 0.128 -0.924 -0.989 -0.667 -0.664 
-25 -0.03% 0.128 -0.358 -0.511 -0.033 -0.555 
-24 -0.87% 0.087 -1.321$ -1.540$ -1.122 -1.424$ 
-23 -0.25% 0.128 -0.512 -0.649 -0.318 -0.361 
-22 -0.39% 0.169 -0.199 -0.232 -0.501 -0.094 
-21 0.04% 0.128 -0.153 -0.165 0.054 0.105 
-20 -1.46% 1:6< -1.755* -1.604$ -1.889* -1.546$ 
-19 0.95% 0.169 0.971 0.767 1.235 0.689 
-18 -0.10% 0.169 -0.006 -0.015 -0.131 0.16 
-17 0.28% 0.169 0.652 0.488 0.361 0.196 
-16 -0.32% 0.128 -0.365 -0.368 -0.416 -0.465 
-15 -0.02% 0.128 0.167 0.245 -0.021 0.074 
-14 0.84% 0.210 1.330$ 1.525$ 1.081 1.671* 
-13 -0.26% 0.128 -0.337 -0.481 -0.331 -0.356 
-12 0.59% 0.210 0.542 0.724 0.769 0.694 
-11 -0.14% 0.169 -0.676 -0.587 -0.187 0.038 
-10 0.10% 0.128 0.166 0.281 0.133 0.246 
-9 -0.68% 0.128 -0.763 -0.717 -0.878 -0.664 
-8 -0.27% 0.128 0.031 0.035 -0.345 -0.148 
-7 -0.43% 0.128 -0.213 -0.349 -0.551 -0.293 
-6 -1.52% 1:6< -1.990* -3.320*** -1.970* -2.487** 
-5 0.85% 0.169 0.838 1.932* 1.101 1.417$ 
-4 -0.42% 0.169 -0.512 -0.527 -0.542 -0.519 
-3 -0.04% 0.128 0.525 0.481 -0.056 0.042 
-2 0.51% 0.128 0.461 0.46 0.664 0.739 
-1 0.24% 0.087 0.065 0.084 0.316 -0.162 
0 -0.33% 0.128 -0.07 -0.069 -0.423 -0.207 
1 -0.18% 0.169 -0.537 -0.441 -0.238 -0.098 
2 -1.41% 1:6< -1.649* -2.705** -1.830* -2.369** 
3 -0.06% 0.128 0.599 0.414 -0.076 0.368 
4 -0.05% 0.169 0.45 0.475 -0.066 0.522 
5 1.00% 6:1> 1.389$ 2.589** 1.300$ 2.042* 
6 -0.18% 0.128 -0.2 -0.186 -0.227 -0.03 
7 0.96% 0.210 1.171 2.255* 1.243 1.725* 
8 0.48% 0.210 0.463 0.748 0.619 0.779 
9 -0.37% 0.128 -0.535 -1.087 -0.477 -0.732 
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REITs 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
10 -0.67% 0.128 -1.253 -0.767 -0.865 -0.46 
11 0.01% 0.128 0.134 0.193 0.013 0.264 
12 -0.17% 0.087 0.117 0.117 -0.215 -0.08 
13 -0.39% 0.169 -0.758 -0.628 -0.502 -0.18 
14 -0.92% 1:6< -0.584 -0.433 -1.194 -1.315$ 
15 -0.78% 0.128 -0.736 -0.661 -1.015 -0.632 
16 -1.49% 0.128 -2.165* -2.039* -1.928* -1.885* 
17 0.55% 0.169 0.498 0.694 0.718 0.811 
18 0.00% 0.128 -0.168 -0.173 -0.002 -0.22 
19 -0.51% 0.128 -1.021 -0.9 -0.655 -0.483 
20 0.57% 0.128 0.03 0.021 0.732 -0.094 
21 -0.13% 0.169 -0.288 -0.19 -0.165 0.096 
22 -0.49% 0.087 -0.75 -1.534$ -0.639 -1.039 
23 -0.57% 1:6< -0.985 -1.628$ -0.738 -1.238 
24 -0.66% 0.087 -0.733 -1.078 -0.854 -0.89 
25 -0.77% 0.087 -0.968 -1.543$ -1.001 -1.039 
26 0.50% 0.169 0.563 0.397 0.652 0.336 
27 -0.32% 0.128 0.066 0.079 -0.415 -0.067 
28 -0.09% 0.169 -0.248 -0.256 -0.117 -0.143 
29 0.52% 0.210 0.808 0.977 0.674 1.101 
30 0.21% 0.128 0.237 0.559 0.268 0.567 
              
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels 
of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, <, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -
- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less than in the parameter estimation 
period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation period. 
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Acquirer C-Corporation, Target Returns   
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
-30 2.42% 0.127 1.515$ 0.842 2.080* 0.46 
-29 -0.65% 1:5( -0.84 -1.156 -0.558 -1.14 
-28 -1.34% 1:5( -1.239 -1.739* -1.147 -1.372$ 
-27 0.46% 0.127 0.33 0.546 0.398 0.63 
-26 0.09% 0.127 0.022 0.047 0.078 0.121 
-25 -0.91% 1:5( -0.814 -1.417$ -0.781 -1.14 
-24 -0.27% 0.127 -0.191 -0.209 -0.229 -0.053 
-23 0.86% 0.127 0.648 0.382 0.741 0.103 
-22 -0.83% 0.086 -0.637 -0.85 -0.716 -0.886 
-21 0.80% 0.168 0.528 1.557$ 0.689 1.057 
-20 0.62% 0.168 0.386 0.407 0.533 0.589 
-19 0.33% 0.127 0.189 0.218 0.283 0.335 
-18 -0.13% 0.127 -0.266 -0.342 -0.11 -0.173 
-17 0.82% 0.168 0.993 1.390$ 0.705 1.16 
-16 -0.28% 0.127 -0.531 -0.416 -0.237 -0.44 
-15 -0.10% 0.168 0.014 0.025 -0.088 0.188 
-14 -0.10% 0.168 0.03 0.065 -0.082 0.389 
-13 -0.54% 0.127 -0.613 -1.154 -0.468 -0.628 
-12 -1.31% 0.086 -1.153 -1.249 -1.129 -0.971 
-11 -1.62% 1:5( -1.289$ -2.220* -1.395$ -1.599$ 
-10 0.22% 0.127 0.051 0.124 0.186 0.202 
-9 -0.11% 0.127 -0.137 -0.301 -0.098 -0.115 
-8 -0.91% 0.086 -0.867 -1.016 -0.784 -0.859 
-7 0.02% 0.168 0.389 0.485 0.016 0.598 
-6 -1.16% 1:5( -1.211 -2.304* -0.995 -1.608$ 
-5 0.76% 0.168 0.291 0.296 0.657 0.451 
-4 1.37% 0.086 0.934 0.555 1.173 -0.097 
-3 0.75% 0.086 0.626 0.458 0.64 -0.186 
-2 0.30% 1:5( 0.274 0.304 0.254 -0.061 
-1 1.32% 0.127 1.351$ 0.824 1.135 0.585 
0 8.55% 0.168 5.772*** 1.147 7.340*** 1.784* 
1 -0.29% 0.127 -0.124 -0.065 -0.247 0.251 
2 1.88% 0.127 1.284$ 1.26 1.613$ 1.12 
3 -0.11% 0.086 -0.411 -0.459 -0.093 -0.329 
4 -0.50% 0.127 -0.294 -0.797 -0.428 -0.262 
5 -0.60% 0.086 -0.447 -0.73 -0.515 -0.391 
6 0.40% 0.168 0.325 0.474 0.342 0.634 
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Acquirer C-Corporation, Target Returns   
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
7 0.43% 0.168 0.303 0.71 0.365 0.523 
8 1.19% 0.127 0.797 0.9 1.026 0.661 
9 -0.36% 0.086 -0.377 -0.786 -0.312 -0.467 
10 -0.61% 0.127 -0.287 -0.433 -0.527 -0.195 
11 0.06% 0.086 0.544 0.548 0.053 0.219 
12 0.20% 0.127 -0.126 -0.156 0.174 0.121 
13 0.13% 0.168 -0.063 -0.134 0.11 0.184 
14 -1.16% 1:5( -1.164 -2.574** -0.999 -1.573$ 
15 0.58% 0.168 0.33 0.514 0.501 0.687 
16 0.17% 0.086 -0.058 -0.077 0.147 -0.186 
17 0.62% 0.168 0.549 1.042 0.532 0.964 
18 0.28% 0.086 0.067 0.096 0.243 -0.11 
19 -0.84% 0.127 -0.895 -1.726* -0.718 -1.002 
20 0.67% 0.168 0.334 0.448 0.575 0.687 
21 -0.97% 0.086 -0.719 -1.926* -0.832 -0.998 
22 -0.89% 0.086 -0.743 -1.538$ -0.766 -0.904 
23 0.16% 0.127 -0.036 -0.088 0.135 0.179 
24 -0.36% 0.168 -0.347 -0.43 -0.311 -0.146 
25 -0.61% 0.086 -0.448 -0.595 -0.527 -0.489 
26 1.16% 0.168 0.91 1.642$ 0.998 1.276 
27 0.42% 0.168 0.237 0.315 0.362 0.362 
28 0.26% 5:1> 0.436 0.763 0.226 0.852 
29 -0.88% 1:5( -0.4 -0.432 -0.754 -0.775 
30 -0.13% 0.086 -0.31 -0.411 -0.109 -0.476 
              
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels 
of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, <, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -
- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less than in the parameter estimation 
period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation period. 
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Acquirer REIT, Target Returns   
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
-30 -0.24% 0.129 -0.164 -0.245 -0.208 -0.431 
-29 0.81% 7:2> 0.584 1.159 0.7 1.045 
-28 0.04% 0.170 -0.338 -0.318 0.038 -0.442 
-27 0.23% 0.211 -0.023 -0.038 0.197 0.302 
-26 -2.07% 1:8< -1.649* -1.713* -1.796* -2.359** 
-25 -0.51% 0.170 0.107 0.14 -0.446 0.416 
-24 -0.74% 0.129 -1.303$ -1.547$ -0.646 -1.339$ 
-23 -0.52% 0.211 0.102 0.08 -0.449 -0.412 
-22 1.13% 0.252 0.698 1.584$ 0.983 1.178 
-21 0.32% 0.129 -0.021 -0.033 0.281 -0.221 
-20 -1.08% 0.129 -0.953 -1.154 -0.937 -0.799 
-19 0.43% 0.211 0.494 0.783 0.371 0.626 
-18 0.66% 2:7( -0.02 -0.028 0.577 -0.294 
-17 -0.08% 0.211 0.19 0.369 -0.065 0.574 
-16 0.15% 2:7( -0.297 -0.575 0.134 -0.622 
-15 -0.12% 0.211 0.162 0.203 -0.101 -0.118 
-14 0.16% 0.129 0.551 0.417 0.139 -0.372 
-13 2.11% 7:2> 2.435** 2.174* 1.829* 2.098* 
-12 1.10% 0.211 1.199 0.924 0.955 0.313 
-11 -0.25% 0.170 -0.569 -0.625 -0.22 -0.662 
-10 0.11% 0.170 0.749 0.779 0.092 0.401 
-9 0.81% 0.211 0.6 1.101 0.706 0.732 
-8 0.60% 0.252 0.781 0.853 0.519 1.207 
-7 -0.13% 0.211 -0.057 -0.064 -0.113 -0.361 
-6 -0.27% 0.211 0.133 0.135 -0.234 0.397 
-5 1.23% 0.252 1.338$ 2.593** 1.065 1.866* 
-4 1.60% 0.211 1.012 0.841 1.390$ 0.857 
-3 1.38% 0.211 0.906 0.798 1.2 0.545 
-2 1.21% 7:2> 1.039 1.661* 1.049 1.844* 
-1 0.51% 0.170 -0.014 -0.013 0.446 -0.224 
0 5.55% 0.252 3.976*** 1.575$ 4.815*** 1.317$ 
1 3.26% 0.211 2.056* 0.707 2.829** 0.523 
2 0.29% 0.170 0.924 0.769 0.255 0.158 
3 -0.88% 0.211 -0.358 -0.557 -0.761 0.169 
4 0.65% 0.211 0.479 1.298$ 0.562 1.041 
5 0.17% 0.211 0.209 0.306 0.147 0.545 
6 0.06% 0.252 -0.081 -0.107 0.053 0.092 
7 0.26% 0.170 0.317 0.687 0.227 0.648 
8 0.17% 0.211 -0.049 -0.149 0.151 0.283 
9 0.03% 0.170 -0.021 -0.063 0.023 0.221 
10 -0.39% 0.211 -0.5 -0.963 -0.341 -0.401 
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Acquirer REIT, Target Returns   
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
11 0.16% 0.129 0.032 0.061 0.143 0.121 
12 0.02% 0.211 0.158 0.398 0.02 0.592 
13 -0.27% 0.170 -0.613 -0.914 -0.235 -0.725 
14 0.38% 0.170 0.611 0.968 0.334 0.824 
15 -0.33% 0.170 -0.355 -1.085 -0.288 -0.563 
16 -0.39% 0.211 -0.726 -1.205 -0.335 -0.78 
17 -0.66% 0.129 -0.644 -1.076 -0.572 -0.769 
18 -0.24% 2:7( -0.482 -0.764 -0.207 -0.997 
19 -1.55% 1:8< -1.526$ -2.269* -1.349$ -2.035* 
20 0.29% 0.211 -0.23 -0.302 0.248 -0.066 
21 0.09% 0.170 0.176 0.253 0.078 0.063 
22 0.16% 0.252 -0.338 -0.403 0.14 0.309 
23 -0.23% 0.170 -0.259 -0.641 -0.203 -0.298 
24 0.18% 0.170 0.261 0.769 0.153 0.416 
25 0.13% 0.170 0.02 0.051 0.115 0.239 
26 -0.15% 0.170 0.32 0.411 -0.129 0.158 
27 0.19% 0.211 0.006 0.014 0.169 0.28 
28 -0.13% 0.252 0.268 0.563 -0.112 0.5 
29 0.24% 0.211 0.158 0.277 0.209 0.526 
30 0.18% 0.211 0.365 0.632 0.158 0.456 
              
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels 
of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, <, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -
- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less than in the parameter estimation 
period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation period. 
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A Market-cap Weighted Portfolio with 
 C-Corporation Acquirers (long) and their Targets (long) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
-30 -0.19% 2:04 -0.296 -0.587 -0.213 -0.395 
-29 -0.63% 2:04 -0.993 -1.919* -0.697 -1.05 
-28 -1.22% 1:5( -1.947* -1.28 -1.352$ -1.743* 
-27 0.01% 3:03 0.07 0.102 0.01 0.204 
-26 0.47% 3:03 0.247 0.356 0.518 0.412 
-25 -0.60% 2:04 -0.545 -1.325$ -0.659 -0.761 
-24 0.00% 3:03 -0.086 -0.096 -0.003 0.349 
-23 -0.07% 2:04 0.02 0.014 -0.082 -0.196 
-22 -1.17% 0:6<< -1.699* -2.709** -1.298$ -1.832* 
-21 0.43% 4:02 0.189 0.213 0.476 0.659 
-20 -0.01% 4:02 0.351 0.445 -0.016 0.553 
-19 -0.26% 2:04 -0.217 -0.559 -0.285 -0.272 
-18 -0.55% 2:04 -0.718 -0.747 -0.605 -0.51 
-17 -0.19% 1:5( 0.214 0.137 -0.213 -0.65 
-16 0.39% 2:04 0.432 0.424 0.426 0.149 
-15 -0.15% 3:03 0.196 0.192 -0.169 0.068 
-14 0.14% 3:03 0.433 0.732 0.152 0.655 
-13 -0.69% 1:5( -0.707 -1.273 -0.763 -0.663 
-12 1.36% 5:1) 1.264 1.186 1.503$ 1.369$ 
-11 -1.24% 1:5( -1.194 -1.596$ -1.364$ -1.437$ 
-10 -0.17% 2:04 -0.269 -0.519 -0.184 -0.31 
-9 -0.68% 1:5( -0.775 -3.207*** -0.751 -0.978 
-8 -1.06% 1:5( -1.184 -1.995* -1.17 -1.458$ 
-7 1.38% 5:1) 2.018* 2.251* 1.525$ 1.922* 
-6 -0.31% 2:04 -0.374 -0.71 -0.345 -0.438 
-5 0.55% 4:02 0.262 0.227 0.605 0.684 
-4 0.65% 2:04 0.678 0.461 0.719 -0.089 
-3 0.76% 4:02 0.915 1.790* 0.841 1.22 
-2 -0.73% 3:03 -0.746 -0.647 -0.806 -0.565 
-1 0.46% 3:03 0.993 0.816 0.508 0.531 
0 -2.00% 2:04 -2.721** -1.584$ -2.212* -1.509$ 
1 -0.31% 3:03 -0.622 -0.222 -0.345 -0.034 
2 2.02% 3:03 2.037* 1.755* 2.236* 1.611$ 
3 -0.24% 2:04 -0.311 -0.27 -0.262 -0.493 
4 -0.99% 1:5( -1.149 -2.483** -1.097 -1.394$ 
5 -0.11% 3:03 -0.221 -0.262 -0.124 0.191 
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A Market-cap Weighted Portfolio with 
 C-Corporation Acquirers (long) and their Targets (long) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
6 0.55% 4:02 0.712 0.772 0.603 0.808 
7 0.07% 2:04 0.091 0.147 0.076 0.055 
8 1.13% 3:03 1.441$ 0.96 1.247 0.553 
9 -0.01% 2:04 0.032 0.064 -0.014 0.034 
10 -0.21% 3:03 -0.043 -0.059 -0.229 -0.123 
11 -0.43% 2:04 -0.187 -0.145 -0.473 -0.289 
12 0.08% 3:03 -0.031 -0.043 0.093 0.077 
13 0.14% 3:03 -0.067 -0.085 0.155 0.255 
14 -1.09% 1:5( -1.463$ -2.086* -1.207 -1.509$ 
15 0.00% 4:02 -0.251 -0.253 -0.004 0.149 
16 0.62% 3:03 0.412 0.549 0.683 0.582 
17 0.83% 5:1) 1.015 1.136 0.919 1.318$ 
18 0.12% 2:04 -0.051 -0.078 0.132 -0.098 
19 -0.36% 3:03 -0.651 -0.879 -0.401 -0.485 
20 -0.13% 3:03 -0.126 -0.178 -0.139 -0.17 
21 -0.89% 2:04 -1.04 -1.898* -0.984 -1.224 
22 -0.72% 2:04 -0.845 -2.037* -0.8 -1.084 
23 0.33% 3:03 0.316 0.701 0.37 0.578 
24 -0.41% 2:04 -0.574 -0.77 -0.451 -0.502 
25 -0.21% 4:02 -0.375 -0.425 -0.235 -0.089 
26 0.07% 3:03 -0.104 -0.188 0.074 -0.085 
27 0.07% 3:03 0.097 0.226 0.076 0.204 
28 0.00% 4:02 0.283 0.437 -0.005 0.421 
29 -0.65% 2:04 -0.77 -0.674 -0.714 -0.553 
30 -0.94% 2:04 -1.023 -1.197 -1.034 -1.114 
              
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels 
of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, <, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -
- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less than in the parameter estimation 
period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation period. 
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A Market-cap Weighted Portfolio with 
 REIT Acquirers (long) and their Targets (long) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
-30 0.96% 5:1> 1.411$ 1.193 1.257 1.226 
-29 0.67% 5:1> 1 1.417$ 0.882 1.346$ 
-28 -0.46% 2:04 -1.017 -0.918 -0.605 -0.92 
-27 -0.29% 3:03 -0.439 -0.413 -0.377 -0.148 
-26 -0.91% 1:5( -1.425$ -1.211 -1.189 -1.531$ 
-25 -0.10% 2:04 -0.199 -0.57 -0.128 0.005 
-24 -1.00% 2:04 -1.549$ -1.740* -1.308$ -1.633$ 
-23 -0.28% 2:04 -0.334 -0.295 -0.369 -0.504 
-22 0.29% 5:1> 0.525 1.067 0.382 0.832 
-21 -0.26% 2:04 -0.508 -0.655 -0.346 -0.495 
-20 -1.79% 1:5( -2.270* -1.693* -2.346** -1.836* 
-19 0.97% 4:02 1.062 0.864 1.268 0.999 
-18 0.01% 2:04 -0.009 -0.03 0.016 0.12 
-17 0.54% 4:02 0.507 0.527 0.705 0.694 
-16 -0.42% 2:04 -0.757 -1 -0.557 -0.999 
-15 0.01% 4:02 0.057 0.142 0.011 0.12 
-14 1.23% 3:03 1.667* 1.054 1.607$ 0.902 
-13 0.37% 4:02 0.537 0.651 0.484 0.943 
-12 0.69% 5:1> 0.86 2.069* 0.901 1.221 
-11 -0.41% 3:03 -1.005 -1.037 -0.544 -0.61 
-10 0.46% 3:03 0.714 0.814 0.6 0.601 
-9 0.15% 3:03 0.245 0.325 0.192 0.074 
-8 0.31% 4:02 0.818 0.953 0.406 1.258 
-7 -0.24% 3:03 -0.39 -0.758 -0.31 -0.342 
-6 -0.87% 2:04 -1.038 -1.537$ -1.136 -1.165 
-5 0.78% 4:02 0.965 2.481** 1.025 1.480$ 
-4 0.73% 5:1> 0.915 1.139 0.962 1.267 
-3 -0.04% 4:02 0.356 0.41 -0.051 0.476 
-2 0.29% 5:1> 0.432 0.536 0.381 1.017 
-1 0.42% 3:03 0.193 0.19 0.557 0.042 
0 0.55% 3:03 0.561 0.431 0.72 0.153 
1 1.67% 3:03 0.874 0.313 2.191* 0.074 
2 -0.55% 1:5( -0.377 -0.278 -0.723 -1.397$ 
3 -0.37% 3:03 -0.131 -0.106 -0.485 0.222 
4 0.16% 4:02 0.405 0.58 0.21 0.856 
5 1.08% 6:0>> 1.439$ 3.720*** 1.412$ 2.174* 
6 -0.17% 3:03 -0.093 -0.077 -0.222 -0.134 
7 1.00% 5:1> 1.161 2.741** 1.311$ 1.975* 
8 0.23% 3:03 0.064 0.094 0.296 0.176 
9 -0.30% 3:03 -0.498 -0.823 -0.399 -0.472 
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A Market-cap Weighted Portfolio with 
 REIT Acquirers (long) and their Targets (long) 
 
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive:  
Negative Patell  Z StdCsect Z 
Portfolio 
Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Rank Test 
Z 
10 -0.42% 2:04 -0.717 -0.978 -0.55 -1.138 
11 0.28% 3:03 0.31 0.46 0.371 0.499 
12 0.21% 3:03 0.373 0.512 0.276 0.61 
13 -0.45% 3:03 -0.693 -0.614 -0.584 -0.523 
14 0.16% 3:03 0.56 0.43 0.214 0.259 
15 -0.21% 3:03 -0.14 -0.177 -0.278 -0.254 
16 -1.28% 2:04 -1.591$ -2.316* -1.673* -1.873* 
17 0.01% 4:02 -0.04 -0.06 0.011 0.379 
18 -0.48% 2:04 -0.948 -1.358$ -0.625 -1.124 
19 -0.51% 2:04 -0.612 -1.413$ -0.663 -0.86 
20 -0.25% 2:04 -0.76 -0.681 -0.324 -0.684 
21 0.34% 4:02 0.158 0.103 0.442 0.43 
22 -0.53% 1:5( -1.003 -1.439$ -0.696 -1.156 
23 -0.52% 1:5( -0.802 -1.593$ -0.678 -1.457$ 
24 -0.16% 3:03 -0.037 -0.062 -0.208 -0.213 
25 -0.17% 4:02 -0.279 -0.432 -0.217 0.12 
26 0.85% 3:03 1.152 0.785 1.12 0.879 
27 -0.05% 3:03 0.144 0.229 -0.071 0.305 
28 -0.11% 4:02 -0.271 -0.284 -0.15 0.046 
29 0.34% 4:02 0.468 0.665 0.445 1.054 
30 0.32% 3:03 0.57 1.05 0.423 0.99 
              
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. For Generalized sign test, significance levels 
of .10, .05, .01 and .001 are denoted by (, <, <<, <<< or ), >, >>, >>> respectively. Left brackets -
- (, < -- appear when the ratio of positive to negative is less than in the parameter estimation 
period. Right brackets mean that the ratio is more positive than in the estimation period. 
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APPENDIX 6: THE UPREIT  
 
The Umbrella Partnership REIT (UPREIT) structure is essentially a hybrid between a corporation and a 
partnership.  In  this  structure,  the  REIT’s  properties  are  owned  and  operated  by  one  or  more  
partnerships that are in turned owned under the umbrella  of  a  single  partnership,  called  an  “Operating  
Partnership” (Whyte, Hillers, Bloom, & Jones, 1999).  The REIT owns a controlling interest in the 
operating partnership.  The figure below shows a simplified form of the UPREIT. 
 
 
 
 
The UPREIT became popular because it significantly reduced the cost of going public for private real 
estate firms by allowing them to contribute their assets in a tax-efficient manner.  The IRS considers an 
exchange of an interest in one partnership for an interest in another partnership as a non-taxable event, 
because the form of ownership does not change.  Instead of cash or common stock of the REIT, the 
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property owners receive operating units (OP units) in exchange for their properties. These OP units are 
similar to common stock but are not listed on stock exchange and selling them results in a taxable event 
(Geltner, Miller, Clayton, & Eichholtz, 2007).  
 
The UPREIT can create conflicts of interest because the REIT, as general partner of the Operating 
Partnership, has a fiduciary duty to the limited partners of the Operating Partnership. However, the REIT 
has a fiduciary duty to its shareholders as well. If the Operating Partnership sells the properties, those 
who contributed them in exchange for OP units could incur a taxable gain.  This could discourage 
management from pursuing a sale that might actually be in the best interest of the REIT (Whyte, Hillers, 
Bloom, & Jones, 1999). 
 
 
 
